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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613 allows a person who is dissatisfied by a
decision of the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") to "obtain judicial review
by complying with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act."
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or
Court of Appeals to review all final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative hearings. Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 14 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over the
final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Is Ms. Montierth ("Petitioner") precluded from raising issues of due
process, statutory construction, and evidentiary errors by failing to raise
them before the administrative hearing officer ("AHO")?

2.

If Petitioner can survive her failure to raise due process issues before the
AHO, did the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") grant Petitioner
constitutional procedural due process by granting her a formal
administrative hearing?

3.

If Petitioner can survive her failure to raise due process issues before the
AHO, does Petitioner have an individual property interest in her late
husband's retirement benefit to invoke the due process clause?

4.

If Petitioner can survive her failure to raise statutory construction issues
before the AHO, does the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §49-13405(2) grant Petitioner any retirement benefit as the spouse of a retiree?

5.

If Petitioner can survive her failure to raise evidentiary errors before the
AHO, did the AHO err in admitting and considering Petitioner's hearsay
testimony and interpreting the hearsay rule to preclude a finding of fact
based solely on hearsay under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-10(3)?

6.

Was Mr. Montierth's signed and notarized retirement application valid
and complete pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-402?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4) specifically enumerates the relief which this Court may grant on an
appeal from a formal administrative hearing before the Board. Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-16(4) states:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by one of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied;

(b)

the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by
any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring
resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed
procedure;
(f)
the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by
statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for
the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Mrs. Kathy Montierth ("Petitioner") failed to point to any specific
subsection for relief under Section 63-46b-16(4) where the Board erred. The Utah
Court of Appeals has duly noted that "Because the standard of review under
UAPA will vary based on the subsection the claim is brought under, we strongly
encourage counsel to clearly identify under what section review is being sought
and to make certain they identify the appropriate standard of review under that
section^ King v. Industrial Com 'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281,1287 n.7 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993)(emphasis added).

Even though Petitioner failed to point to the applicable error section under
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4), it seems axiomatic that Petitioner's issues she
failed to raise before the administrative hearing officer should be reviewed de
novo by this Court.
However, on issues of fact, u[a]n agency's findings of fact... are accorded
substantial deference and will not be overturned if based on substantial evidence,
even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible." Murphy v. State
Retirement Bd, 2004 UT App. 109, *1 (Ut. Ct. App. 2004), cert, denied, 94 P.3d
929(July 19, 2004); quoting, Hurley v. Board of Review oflnd. Com 'n, 767 P.2d
524, 526-27 (Utah 1988). "Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id; quoting,
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)(quotations and citations omitted). The Appellate Court does not conduct a
de novo credibility determination or reweigh the evidence. Questar Pipeline Co.
v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). Nor will an agency's
findings of fact be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another
conclusion from the evidence is permissible. Hurley, 767 P.2d 524 at 526-27. It
is the province of the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve conflicting
evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence,
it is for the agency to draw the inference. Albertsons Inc. v. Dept. of Employment
Security, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah Ct App. 1993).

Similarly, the Appellate Court will grant deference to the agency's
interpretation or application of law when "there is a grant of discretion to the
agency concerning the language in question, either expressly made in the statute or
implied from the statutory language." Morton Int'n., Inc. v. Auditing Division,
814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991). "Where a grant exists, [the Appellate Court] will
not disturb the agency's interpretation or application of the law unless its
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." King, 850
P.2d 1281 at 1286. The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted such a grant of
discretion broadly. See, Id, at 1288 (After reviewing examples of grants of
discretion to agencies, the Court states, "In each case the language of the statute
and the statutory scheme support a finding of at least an implicit grant of
discretion.").
Here, the legislature granted to the Board the general power to "develop
broad policy for the . . . various . . . programs under broad discretion . . . ,
including the specific authority to interpret and define any provision or term under
this title . . . [.]" Utah Code Ann. § 49-1 l-203(l)(k). Thus, since the Legislature
granted express authority to the Board to make legal determinations under Utah
Code Ann. Title 49, this Court should not disturb the Board's interpretations of
law unless they "exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." King, 850
P.2d 1281 at 1286.1

1

Although the Court failed to grant deference to the Board's authority in its most
recent case, the Court did so without considering the legislature's change to the
*

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-401 states,
(1) A member is qualified to receive an allowance from this
system when:
(a) the member ceases actual work for a participating
employer in this system before the member's retirement date and
provides evidence of the termination;
(b) the member has submitted to the office a notarized
retirement application form that states the member's proposed
retirement date; and
(c) one of the following conditions is met as of the member's
retirement date:
(i) the member has accrued at least four years of service credit
and has attained an age of 65 years;
(ii) the member has accrued at least ten years of service credit
and has attained an age of 62 years;
(iii) the member has accrued at least 20 years of service credit
and has attained an age of 60 years;
(iv) the member has accrued at least 30 years of service credit;
or
(v) the member has accrued at least 25 years of service credit,
in which case the member shall be subject to the reduction under
Subsection 49-13-402(2)(b).
(2) (a) The member's retirement date shall be the 1st or the
16th day of the month, as selected by the member, but the
retirement date must be on or after the date of termination.
(b) The retirement date may not be more than 90 days before
or after the date the application is received by the office.

Board's statutory authority. See, Hilton v. State Retirement Bd, 2005 UT App
408 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). The Court cited Epperson v. Utah State Retirement
Bd., 949 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), but since the Epperson decision, and
in response to the Epperson decision, the legislature has granted the Board express
permission to make legal determinations concerning its applicable statutes. See,
Id

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Ms. Kathy Montierth ("Petitioner") filed a Request for Board Action on
March 21, 2005, requesting the Utah State Retirement Board (hereinafter "Board")
grant her request "to honor the intention of Mr. Montierth and provide Plan 3 joint
life benefits to Ms. Montierth." Hearing Record (hereinafter "HR") at 6. A
hearing was held on August 22, 2005, before the Administrative Hearing Officer
(hereinafter "AHO"), James Barker, on Petitioner's Request for Board Action.
Petitioner was represented by Rocky D. Crofts of Smith Knowles, P.C. The Board
was represented by David B. Hansen. At the conclusion of the testimony, the
AHO ruled in favor of the Board and directed Mr. Hansen, counsel for the Board,
to draft a proposed Order. See, Hearing Transcript (hereinafter "HT") at 50:13.
On August 31, 2005, David B. Hansen sent a letter to Rocky D. Crofts with the
enclosed proposed order for his approval as to form, or in the alternative,
directions to file objections to the order. See, HR 54. Rocky D. Crofts signed the
order indicating that it was approved as to form. See, HR 59. The Order was then
signed by the AHO on August 13, 2005. See, HR 58. The Board adopted the
Final Order on October 13, 2005. See, Id, Petitioner then filed a Request for
Board Reconsideration on October 27, 2005. See, HR 62. A Petition for Review
of Administrative Order was filed by Petitioner on November 10, 2005. See, HR
66. The Board filed a Response on December 8, 2005, denying Petitioner's
request for reconsideration. See, HR 69. Petitioner filed her Petition for Review
in this matter on October 14, 2005.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/ FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Wesley V. Montierth ("Mr. Montierth") was a member of the Public
Employees' Noncontributory Retirement System ("PERS"). See, HR 47.
PERS is administered by the Utah State Retirement Office ("Office"). See,
Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-201(l)(b).
Prior to his retirement, Mr. Montierth contacted the Office concerning his
retirement benefits and requested and received three Retirement Benefit
Estimates ("Estimates"). See, HT 36:5-6, HR 50-53. These estimates were
to assist Mr. Montierth in making his retirement decisions.
In order to meet the eligibility requirements to retire with 30 years of
service credit, Mr. Montierth made a purchase of future service credit
amounting to $35,871.44, on July 2, 2002. See, HT 38:21-22, 39:18, 42:1920.
On August 16, 2002, Mr. Montierth filed an Application for Service
Retirement ("Application") with the Office for a July 16, 2002, retirement
date.

See,UR47.

On his Application, Petitioner selected retirement "Plan 1." See, HT 37:7;
HR47.
On August 16, 2002, Mr. Montierth had his signature on his completed
Application notarized by Ms. Ann Hancock Young, a retirement counselor,
and submitted his application to the Office for processing. See, HR 47.
Mr. Montierth expressly asserted by signing the Application:

In accordance with the statutes governing the Utah Retirement
Systems, I make application for retirement benefits. I understand the
limitations as described on the reverse side of this form. I hereby
certify that the information provided on this form and any of the
attached forms is true correct, and complete to the best of my
knowledge.
Id.
9.

For 27 months, Mr. Montierth received and benefited from a Plan One
retirement benefit which provided substantially more in retirement benefits
than a Plan Three, or any other retirement plan benefit. See, HT 35:18-22.

10.

Petitioner testified at the hearing that Mr. Montierth "opted for one
[retirement benefit] that paid out a little bit more higher up front." HT
25:21-22.

11.

Mr. Montierth passed away on October 20, 2004, from an apparent suicide.
See, HT 36:1-2.

12.

Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Mr. Montierth. See, HT 5:7-10.

13.

At the administrative hearing before the AHO, Petitioner's sole argument
was that her husband, Mr. Montierth, mistakenly selected retirement Plan
One and meant to select retirement Plan Three on his Application. See, HT
17:5-6.

14.

At the hearing, Petitioner failed to provide any evidence outside of her own
self-serving testimony that Mr. Montierth mistakenly selected retirement
Plan One and meant to select another retirement plan on his Application.
&e,HT 1:1-50:15.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Following a formal administrative hearing, Petitioner mistakenly raises due
process, statutory construction, and evidentiary issues for the first time on appeal.
Petitioner admits to the Court's general rule that the Appellate Court "will not
consider an issue brought for the first time on appeal. . ." State v. NelsonWaggoner, 2004 UT 29, 94 P.3d 186, 189 (Utah 2004). See also, State v. Lopez,
886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah
App. 1991). This rule applies equally to administrative proceedings as district
court proceedings. Brown & Root Indus. Service v. Industrial Corn'n of Utah, 947
P.2d 671, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1997. Although this rule has exceptions, Petitioner
fails to provide sufficient legal or factual analysis as to why she should be allowed
to raise these claims under those exceptions.
Utah Courts have only recognized two limited exceptions to the
preservation rule - 1) "plain error" by the trier of fact, and 2) "exceptional
circumstances." See e.g., State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 2006 WL 73758, at 3
(Utah 2006); State v. Archambeau^ 820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Petitioner
can prove neither.
First, Petitioner cannot prove plain error because she failed to show, '"(i)
[a]n error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (iii)
the error is harmful.'" State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, % 18, 48 P.2d 931, 936 (Utah
2002), quoting, State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Far from being

1A

able to meet all these elements as required to invoke this exception, Petitioner
cannot even meet one of the elements to invoke "plain error." As such, Petitioner
cannot invoke the plain error exception to the preservation rule on her issues of
due process, statutory construction, and evidentiary issues which were not raised
before the AHO.
Second, Petitioner does not qualify under the exceptional circumstances
exception to the preservation rule because she cannot show any exception
circumstance or "rare procedural anomaly" to invoke the exception. State v.
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), quoting, State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1209, n.3 (Utah 1993)(fmding exceptional circumstances exception is "illdefined, and applies primarily to rare procedural anomalies...."). Thus,
Petitioner cannot sustain a claim for the first time on appeal because she cannot
meet either of the exceptions to the general preservation rule.
Even if Petitioner could maintain a claim for violations of procedural due
process without preserving the issue below, the Board granted Petitioner a formal
administrative hearing where she was given wide latitude to present any claim for
additional retirement benefits. Petitioner admits that at the formal hearing she
received notice, obtained legal counsel, called witnesses, presented evidence, and
cross-examined Board witnesses. See, Hearing Record (hereinafter "HR") 5,
Hearing Transcript (hereinafter "HT") 3:1-3, 4:2-3, 16:2-4, 40-49. In fact, no
allegation has been made, and indeed no credible allegation can be made, that the

11

Board did not follow its constitutional formal administrative proceedings to the
letter in denying Petitioner's claim.
But even if Petitioner could sustain a claim for procedural due process
despite not raising it below and receipt of a formal administrative hearing,
Petitioner has not been deprived of an individual vested property interest to invoke
the due process clause. The Court has stated, "Under Utah law, public pension
and retirement systems give rise to vested contractual rights'" Horn v. Utah Dep't
of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct App 1998)(emphasis added). A member of
the retirement systems vests in his/her contractual rights when he meets all the
conditions precedent to receive retirement benefits. See, Utah Public Employees
Ass n. v. State of Utah, 2006 UT 9, ^29 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) citing, Horn, 962
P.2d at 100. These vested contractual rights constitute a property interest.
Conversely, those without vested contractual rights do not have a property interest
in a retirement benefit. Because Petitioner did not have an individual vested
contract right to any retirement benefit of her late husband, she also had no
individual property right to such a benefit. As such, she cannot invoke the due
process clause relating to deprivations of property.
Similarly, despite not raising the issue before the AHO, Petitioner is not
eligible for a benefit under Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 because she misreads the
plain language of the statute. After receiving a retirement benefit, Mr. Montierth
was defined as a retiree, and not a member. Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) states,
"Upon the request of a deceased member's lawful spouse at the time of the

n

member ys death, the deceased member is considered to have retired under Option
Three on the first day of the month following the month in which the member died
...". (emphasis added). Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-102(22)(a) defines "member"
as, "a person, except a retiree, with contributions on deposit with a system ...".
(emphasis added). A "retiree" is defined as "an individual who has qualified for
an allowance under this title." Utah Code Ann. §49-11-102(34). Because Mr.
Montierth, after receiving a retirement allowance, was a retiree, not a member, at
the time of Mr. Montierth's death, Petitioner was a retiree's spouse, not a
member's spouse. As such, Petitioner cannot prove entitlement to any additional
benefit as the spouse of a retiree.
Petitioner's allegations of evidentiary errors by the AHO were also not
raised below and are precluded on appeal. Yet, even if these evidentiary issues
had been properly preserved, the Board committed no error in admitting and
considering all Petitioner's evidence and making a finding concerning Mr.
Montiereth's intent to select a different retirement plan than plan one. Petitioner
simply points to no credible evidence that the AHO made or failed to make any
required finding of fact given her evidence.
Even if Petitioner could point to some error in admitting evidence, such an
error would be harmless error because Utah Code Ann. §49-11-607 precludes any
finding for Petitioner. Subsection (1) states, "After the retirement date, which
shall be set by a member in the member's application for retirement, no alteration,
addition, or cancellation of a benefit may be made... ." Thus, even Mr.

Montierth, let alone his spouse, could not change his retirement plan selection
after his retirement date which he set in his application.
Finally, the only issue Petitioner raised before the AHO that is not
precluded from consideration before this Court under the preservation rule is
whether Mr. Montierth's retirement application was legally complete. Utah Code
Ann. §49-13-401 states, "A member is qualified to receive an allowance from this
system when:... the member has submitted to the office a notarized retirement
application form that states the member's proposed retirement date;..." The
plain language of the statute dictates that in order to be accepted to effectuate
benefits, a retirement application must contain: 1) a selection of a retirement date,
and 2) a notarized signature of the member. It is undisputed that Mr. Montierth's
application contained both a selection of a retirement date and a notarized
signature of Mr. Montierth. Thus, his retirement application was complete and
valid to effectuate his benefits.

ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER FAILED TO RAISE THE MAJORITY OF HER APPELLATE
ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
OFFICER, THEREBY PRECLUDING HER FROM RAISING THEM FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

In her appeal to this Court, Petitioner wrongfully raises issues of
constitutional due process, statutory interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 49-13405(2), and errors by the Administrative Hearing Officer ("AHO") which she

failed to raise before the AHO.2 Petitioner admits to the Court's general rule that
the Appellate Court "will not consider an issue brought for the first time on appeal
. . ." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, 94 P.3d 186, 189 (Utah 2004). See
also, State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820
P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). This rule applies equally to administrative
proceedings as it does to district court proceedings. Brown & Root Indus. Service
v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)("The rule
that courts should not reach issues on review that were not raised before an
administrative agency is so basic and necessary to orderly procedure that we will
enforce it despite the lack of a timely objection by [either party.]"). This general
rule has been of such importance to the Court that it has "been incorporated into
the briefing requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 24
provides that each issue presented for review in an appellant's brief must cite to
the record, showing that the issue was preserved in the trial c o u r t . . . . " State v.
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7, n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Even constitutional issues, like the
due process issues alleged by Petitioner, cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. See e.g., State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah 1991)("We
conclude that a defendant may not assert a constitutional issue for the first time on
appeal unless he can demonstrate 'plain error' or 'exceptional circumstances.'");
2

The only issue Petitioner raised which she legitimately preserved below was her
argument concerning the validity of Mr. Montierth's retirement application. This
argument was of such minor importance to Petitioner that she spent only one
paragraph, and five sentences on it. The Board's response to this argument is
discussed infra at 45.

Pratt v. City Council of City ofRiverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173-74 (Utah
1981)(holding that the general preservation rule "applies equally to constitutional
issues . .."); State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah App. 1991). In addition,
the Court stated the policy behind the general preservation rule as, "in the interest
of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a
claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." State v. Eldredge^ 713 P.2d 29, 36
(Utah 1989). See also, State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah
2000).
Utah Courts have only recognized two limited exceptions to this general
rule - 1) "plain error" by the trier of fact, and 2) "exceptional circumstances."
See e.g., State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 2006 WL 73758, at *3 (Utah 2006); State v.
Archamheaui 820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Although Petitioner correctly
identified the two recognized exceptions to the Preservation Rule in her brief, she
failed to point out which exception applied, or if they both applied, how they both
applied to the facts of her case. In failing to identify the elements or legal analysis
of either exception, Petitioner then wrongly implies that these two exceptions are
really one and the same when using the singular noun "exception" in stating her

3

At least one Court has recognized a third exception to the general preservation
rule - an ineffective assistance of counsel. See, Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7. However,
this exception to the preservation rule was not raised by the Petitioner, does not
apply in civil cases, and thus, not discussed further. See, Davis v. Grand County
Serv. Area, 905 P.2d 888, 894 (Utah Ct.App.1995) ('The doctrine of ineffective
assistance of counsel arises out of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and has no parallel in the civil context."). State v. Hansen, 2002 UT
114,121, n.2, 61 P.3d 1062, 1067.

"four reasons to invoke the exception'' Petitioner's Brief at 21. Petitioner
compounds her misunderstanding of the law in suggesting that these exceptions
are so broad that they "encompass any situation . . . in the interests of justice."
Petitioner's Brief at 20. This is simply untrue. The Court has consistently
reiterated that plain error and exceptional circumstances are two different
exceptions, and that these exceptions are the only recognized exceptions to the
general preservation rule. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, % 14, 2006 WL 73758, *3
(Utah 2006).

A. PETITIONER'S ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL FAIL TO MEET ANY OF THE
REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF "PLAIN ERROR" TO INVOKE THIS EXCEPTION
TO THE PRESERVATION RULE.

Not only does Petitioner fail to meet all of the elements of the plain error
exception as required to invoke this exception to the preservation rule, she cannot
meet even one element of showing plain error. "To establish plain error, an
appellant must demonstrate that '(i) [a]n error exists, (ii) the error should have
been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) the error is harmful.'" State v. Pecht, 2002
UT 41, If 18, 48 P.2d 931, 936 (Utah 2002), quoting, State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208 (Utah 1993). "If any one of these requirements is not met, plain error is not
established." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 (Utah 1993).4

4

Petitioner mistakenly opines that "manifest injustice" was the same as "plain
error" by citing to State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989) and implies
that this is the test for plain error. Petitioner's Brief at 20. This analysis is
incorrect as applied to this case. What Petitioner failed to realize is that the Verde
Court defined the parameters of the specific phrase "manifest injustice" found in

1. PETITIONER FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY ERROR BY THE AHO OR
THE BOARD.

First, Petitioner failed to specifically demonstrate that "an error exists."
Petitioner's allegations of error by the Board which she failed to raise before the
AHO are threefold: 1) procedural due process, 2) failure to follow Utah Code Ann.
§49-13-405, 3) failure of AHO to decide all the issues by failing to consider
evidence. In none of these instances did Petitioner demonstrate error by the
Board.5

Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and not the exception to the
preservation rule. The Verde Court stated, "The question presented by the instant
case is how the standard of 'manifest injustice,' made applicable to instructional
errors through rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, fits within
those categories of error." Id. Criminal Procedure Rule 19(c) deals with a lack of
objections to jury instructions. This case, on the other hand, is a civil
administrative case, and was not tried before a jury. In fact, after hearing
argument that "manifest injustice" was a separate exception to the preservation
rule, the Utah Supreme Court recently implied that the "manifest injustice"
argument was limited to Rule 19(c) cases in stating, " . . . a remedy under rule
19(c) is not available to Mr. Nelson-Waggoner because he has not contested any
jury instructions." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, lj 26, 94 P.3d 186, 191
(Utah 2004).
Although Petitioner was incorrect in using the plain meaning of "manifest
injustice" to argue for plain error exception, it is unclear whether this concept still
may apply to the other exception to the preservation rule, "exceptional
circumstances," discussed infra at 30. The confusion surrounding the term
"manifest injustice" and the two preservation rule exceptions was expressly noted
by the Court of Appeals in State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10, n. 5 (Utah Ct. App.
1996), and perhaps complicated further by the discussion of the Supreme Court in
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^|23, 94 P.3d 186, 191 (Utah 2004). What
is clear from the Court rulings is that the plain meaning of "manifest injustice" is
not the same as "plain error" to invoke the exception to the preservation rule.
5

"Demonstrating" error by the tribunal is different that "alleging" error. A
"demonstration" that an error exists must have some merit in fact or law.
Otherwise the entire policy behind the preservation rule is frustrated if Petitioner

First, Petitioner failed to demonstrate a procedural due process error by the
Board because she specifically received notice and opportunity to be heard at the
administrative hearing held on August 22, 2005. See additional discussion, infra
at 33. The Board granted Petitioner wide latitude at the hearing to present any
issues where she believed she was wronged by the Board's decision denying her
benefits. In fact, jurisdiction in this Court suggests that an administrative hearing
was held below in which a Petitioner was granted notice and the opportunity to be
heard. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16. As such, Petitioner cannot in any way
demonstrate error by the AHO or the Board in failing to grant Petitioner
procedural due process.
Second, Petitioner cannot demonstrate an error by the AHO for failing to
grant her a benefit under U.C.A. §49-13-405 because the plain language of the
statute denies Petitioner a benefit as the spouse of a retiree. See, discussion, infra
at 39. Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) states, "Upon the request of a deceased
member's lawful spouse at the time of the member's death, the deceased member
is considered to have retired under Option Three on the first day of the month
following the month in which the member died ...". (emphasis added). Utah
Code Ann. §49-1 l-102(22)(a) defines "member" as, "a person, except a retiree,

need only "argue" meritless claims for the first time on appeal because a Petitioner
could strategically refuse to raise a potential issue just for the purpose of
guaranteeing himself an overturned verdict on appeal. See argument concerning
invited error infra at 23.
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with contributions on deposit with a system .. .." (emphasis added). A "retiree"
is defined as "an individual who has qualified for an allowance under this title."
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-102(34). Thus, Mr. Montierth, after filing his application
and receiving a retirement allowance, was a retiree, not a member. Similarly, at
the time of Mr. Montierth's death, Petitioner was a retiree's spouse, not a
member's spouse. The plain language of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) clearly
states that this benefit is only intended for a member's spouse, not a retiree's
spouse. Thus, Petitioner failed to demonstrate any error by the AHO or the Board
for not granting Petitioner a benefit under U.C.A. § 49-13-405.
Third, Petitioner pointed to no specific error of law or fact on the part of the
trier of fact, the AHO, in her section on waiver. See, Petitioner's Brief at 19-22.
The closest Petitioner comes to alleging a specific error of law on something
actually decided by the AHO was her argument that, "In essence, the ALJ and the
Board ignored the 'hearsay' evidence . . . " of Mr. Montierth's intent to select a
different retirement plan, and that this amounted to a "constitutional denial."
Petitioner's Brief at 18. Of course, not only does Petitioner fail to point to any
6

As discussed infra at 39, Petitioner cannot excuse her blatant misreading of the
plain language of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 by claiming she did not know that
the term "member" was defined in Utah Code Ann. §49-11-102. Petitioner
specifically pointed to this applicable definition section in her Brief at 8. Whether
this oversight was deliberate or negligent, it is undoubtedly unreasonable.
7
The Petitioner also wrongly alleges that this hearsay testimony as evidence of
Mr. Montierth's intent to select a different retirement plan was not "contested" by
the Board. Petitioner's Brief at 18. The Board strongly disputes that Ms.
Montierth's hearsay testimony was not "contested" by the Board. Mr. Montierth's
notarized retirement application was admitted at the hearing and specifically
shows his express intent to select retirement plan one. See, HR 47.
on

evidence that the AHO and/or the Board disregarded her hearsay testimony, but
the Order's finding of fact No. 11 proves that the AHO and the Board specifically
considered her hearsay statements when it expressly states, "Petitioner failed to
provide any evidence outside of her testimony that Mr. Montierth mistakenly
selected retirement Plan 1 . . . . " Board's Order, HR 56. In addition, the AHO at
the hearing specifically alluded to Petitioner's hearsay testimony in setting forth
one of the reasons for his ruling by stating, " . . . based on the fact that the only
evidence that is given [regarding her husband's intent in selecting a retirement
plan] is the petitioner's statement of what she was told...

I can't see how I can do

anything except rule for the Board . . . . " TR, 50:9-10 (emphasis added). Far from
not considering Petitioner's evidence, the AHO failed to find Petitioner's evidence
persuasive or determinative.
In addition, Petitioner argues that her self-serving statements regarding Mr.
Montierth's intent to select retirement plan three were not "hearsay" because they
"were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted . . . " Petitioner's Brief
at 17. However, Petitioner then contradicts this statement in the next page in
arguing that these statements were not "contested" by the Board and are therefore
"binding upon all parties." Petitioner's Brief at 18. Such as argument admits that
Petitioner's hearsay statements were to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
o

In fact, Petitioner admits that her hearsay testimony was admitted by the AHO
without objection. Petitioner's Brief at 18. It should not be a surprise to the Court
that the Board did not object to Petitioner's hearsay testimony regarding her late
husband's statements at the hearing since hearsay is admissible in administrative
proceedings. See, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8(l)(c).

Petitioner's counsel argued just so at the hearing in stating, "We will
substantiate [Mr. Montierth's intent to select a different retirement plan] by
testimony from Ms. Montierth that will show she had knowledge of Mr.
Montierth's intention and that he, his actions were consistent with him choosing
plan three as opposed to plan one." HT 2:22-25. In fact, this was Petitioner's only
argument at the hearing as to why she was due a benefit. Thus, Petitioner cannot
claim her hearsay evidence should be used one way at the administrative hearing,
then claim it was being used to demonstrate something different on appeal. In any
event, the AHO impliedly ruled that the testimony was hearsay, and this was not
error. See9TR 50:9-10, HR 58.
Although not an error of law, Petitioner also alleges that the AHO erred by
not making a finding of fact regarding her husband's "actual belief as to whether
he intentionally deprived Petitioner of his retirement benefit.9 Petitioner's Brief,

9

As to the findings of fact, even if properly objected to at the hearing, Petitioner
may only be granted relief on appeal from a finding of fact, or lack thereof, if, on
the basis of the factual record, the court determines that she has been prejudiced
by Board action that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the court. See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g).
The Appellate Court does not conduct a de novo credibility determination or
reweigh the evidence. Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Com % 850 P.2d
1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). Nor will an agency's findings of fact be overturned if
based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is
permissible. Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Com yn, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27
(Utah 1988). It is the province of the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve
conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the
same evidence, it is for the agency to draw the inference. Albertons Inc. v.
Department of Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah App. 1993).
Here, the Petitioner asks this Court to create a finding of fact without any
suggestion about what such a finding may look like. The extension of this

at 17. But Petitioner contradicts herself on the following page in implying the
Board erred in making finding of fact No.l 1 stating, "Petitioner failed to provide
any evidence outside of her testimony that Mr. Montierth mistakenly selected
retirement Plan 1 and meant to select another retirement plan on his Application."
Petitioner's Brief, at 18. Because of Petitioner's contradictory statements, the
Board is then left to attempt to divine Petitioner's actual objection or claimed error
since on the one hand Petitioner claims the Board failed to make a specific finding
of fact of intent, and on the other hand, she claims the Board's finding of fact on
intent was error. In any event, the Board correctly decided all the relevant issues
raised by Petitioner and this was not error.
Because Petitioner failed to demonstrate any actual error of law or fact by
the AHO, she cannot meet even the first prong of the plain error exception.

2. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ANY ERROR BY THE AHO AND THE BOARD WAS
INVITED ERROR.
Even if Petitioner is determined to have made some valid claim of an error
of law or fact by the AHO, such an alleged error was "invited error." Recently,
the Utah Supreme Court, after discussing the elements of the "plain error"
exception, stated,

assertion would put the appellate court in the place of the AHO to weigh the
testimony and make findings without being present. Thus, Petitioner's implication
that the Board failed in any way in making a finding of fact is clearly erroneous.

oa

E>ut under the doctrine of invited error, we have declined to engage in even
plain error review when "counsel either by statement or act, affirmatively
represented to the [trial] court that he or she had no objection to the
[proceedings].'5State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54, 70 P.3d 111; accord
Finder, 2005 UT 15,1j 62, 114 P.3d 551; State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT
16, U 9, 86P.3d742.
Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that 'a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court
into committing the error." Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ 9, 86 P.3d 742
{quoting, State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)); accord
Finder, 2005 UT 15, If 62, 114 P.3d 551; Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54, 70
P.3d 111. By precluding appellate review, the doctrine furthers this
principle by "discouraging] parties from intentionally misleading the trial
court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal."
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^f 12, 86 P.3d 742 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,ffif14-15, 2006 WL 73758 (Utah 2006).
Here, Petitioner cannot claim due process, statutory interpretation, or that
the AHO erred in making, or failing to make, a finding of fact or a conclusion of
law to invoke the plain error rule without running afoul of the "invited error"
doctrine.
Following his ruling at the hearing, the AHO requested counsel for the
Board prepare an Order consistent with his ruling. See, HT 50:13. Counsel for the
Board drafted the Order and, with a cover letter, sent it to Petitioner's counsel for
approval as to form. See, HR 54. Petitioner's attorney, Rocky Crofts, of the law
firm of Smith Knowles, P.C., who represented Petitioner at the hearing, approved
the Order as to form by signing the Order without changes, and returned it to the
Board for approval. See, HR. 59. By failing to file objections to the proposed
order and signing the order as to form, Petitioner affirmatively waived any issues
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surrounding alleged errors by the AHO on appeal. If Petitioner truly believed that
error was committed under the due process clause, statutory interpretation, or by
the AHO in making or failing to make a finding of fact or a conclusion of law, she
had ample opportunity to object to the Order before approving it as to form, but
failed to do so. As such, Petitioner's claim of an exception to the preservation rule
for plain error fails because any alleged error was affirmatively invited by
Petitioner.
3. PETITIONER'S ALLEGATIONS OF ERROR ARE NOT PLAIN.

Petitioner cannot meet the plain error exception to the preservation rule
because any error by the AHO was not plain. The second prong of the plain error
exception to the preservation rule is that the alleged error must be "plain" or
"obvious" to the fact finder, the AHO. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Court has stated regarding this element, "from our
examination of the record, we must be able to say that it should have been obvious
to a trial court that it was committing error." Id. Thus, in order to sustain a claim
for procedural due process which was not raised below, Petitioner must show that
the AHO or the Board should have recognized that they had violated Petitioner's
due process rights in granting her an administrative hearing. Of course Petitioner
never explains, and it certainly begs the question, how an AHO could find an
"obvious" error of a failure of notice and opportunity to be heard in the midst of a
formal administrative hearing. Indeed, one of the reasons for administrative

hearings is to grant procedural due process. Without argument to preserve the
issue, any claimed error of procedural due process would not be plain.
Similarly, a claim for benefits under Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 to the
spouse of a retiree would also not be plain absent argument. It seems axiomatic
that in a civil case in which a party fails to state a cause of action or argue under a
statute at a hearing/trial, that party cannot sustain a claim for what they wished
they had claimed before the fact finder for the first time on appeal. If a Petitioner
could prevail this way, it would effectively eviscerate any ability of a trial court or
hearing officer to decide cases and controversies if the tribunal must decide not
only the issues a Petitioner actually raises, but also the issues that a Petitioner
might potentially raise. Although there are some legal issues which arise in
trials/hearing so frequently as to be said to be "plain" to the fact finder, the Board
is unaware of any other individual ever arguing, like Petitioner, for a continuing
benefit under Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 to the spouse of a retiree. Because of
Petitioner's novelty of an argument under this section, such an argument cannot be
said to haive been obvious to the AHO.
Finally, even if the Petitioner establishes error by the AHO in failing to
"consider" Petitioner's hearsay evidence, such an alleged error would not have
been "obvious" to the AHO because even in administrative hearings, hearsay
evidence cannot be the sole basis for a finding of fact. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b10(3). Thus, no finding of fact could have been made based solely on the
Petitioner's hearsay testimony of Mr. Montierth's intent in choosing a retirement

plan. Furthermore, Utah retirement statutes specifically do not allow for the Board
to look beyond the retirement application to determine a member's "intent" at the
time of retirement. See, Utah Code Ann. §49-13-401. Thus, even if Petitioner
demonstrates some error by the AHO to meet the first prong of the plain error test,
she cannot claim that this error was "plain."
4. PETITIONER'S ALLEGATIONS OF ERROR ARE HARMLESS.

Finally, even if Petitioner can sustain a claim of error by the AHO without
specificity and can overcome her invited error in failing to object to the Board's
Order, the alleged error by the AHO was harmless to Petitioner. The Court has
explained this third element of the plain error exception as "absent the error, there
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or
phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
First, Petitioner's allegation that the AHO or the Board violated her due
process guarantees is not harmful error because the remedy for a failure of
procedural due process is to grant a hearing complying with procedural due
process. Petitioner already obtained a formal administrative hearing before the
AHO. Thus, the Board committed no harmful error in granting Petitioner a formal
administrative hearing.
Second, Petitioner's claim that the AHO failed to consider her hearsay
evidence, or that her testimony of Mr. Montierth's intent was not hearsay was
harmless error because no one, not even Mr. Montierth could have changed Mr.

Montierth's retirement selection two years after his retirement date. Utah Code
Ann. § 49-11-607(1) mandates, "After the retirement date, which shall be set by a
member in the member's application for retirement, no alteration, addition, or
cancellation of a benefit may be made . . . ."10 (emphasis added), Thus, hearsay or

Section 49-11-607(1) provides for three exceptions, but none of the stated
exceptions apply to Petitioner's situation. Furthermore, Petitioner did not argue
that any of the exceptions applied either before the AHO or in her Brief to this
Court, and as such is precluded from now raising argument under these sections.
Section 49-11-607 states in full:
(1) After the retirement date, which shall be set by a member in the
member's application for retirement, no alteration, addition, or cancellation of a
benefit may be made except as provided in Subsections (2), (3), and (4) or other
law.
(2) (a) Errors in the records or in the calculations of the office which result
in an incorrect benefit to any member, retiree, participant, covered individual,
alternate payee, or beneficiary shall be corrected by the office if the correction
results in a modification of the benefit amount of $1 or more.
(b) Future payments shall be made to any member, retiree, participant,
covered individual, alternate payee, or beneficiary to:
(i) pay the benefit to which the member or beneficiary was entitled; or
(ii) recover any overpayment.
(3) (a) Errors in the records or calculation of a participating employer
which result in an incorrect benefit to a member, retiree, participant, covered
individual, alternate payee, or beneficiary shall be corrected by the participating
employer.
(b) If insufficient employer contributions have been received by the office,
the participating employer shall pay any delinquent employer contributions, plus
interest under Section 49-11-503, required by the office to maintain the system,
plan, or program affected on an actuarially sound basis.
(c) If excess contributions have been received by the office, the
contributions shall be refunded to the participating employer or member which
paid the contributions.
(4) If a dispute exists between a participating employer and a member at the
time of the member's retirement which will affect the member's benefit
calculation, and notice of the dispute is given to the office prior to the calculation
of a member's benefit, the benefit may be paid based on the member's retirement
date and the records available and then recalculated upon settlement of the dispute.

no hearsay, under law, even the retiree could not change a benefit option after his
retirement date, let alone the retiree's spouse. In fact, Petitioner admits that the
alleged error by the AHO will not likely allow for a more favorable outcome for
her. She stated, "With respect to the evidentiary record, the Utah State Retirement
Board failed to decide a critical issue, or silently assumed it adversely to Appellant
...."

Petitioner's Brief at 17 (emphasis added). This admission that the AHO

would not find in her favor even if the AHO had decided her stated issue,
undercuts her claim of plain "harmful" error. As a result, Petitioner's alleged error
of failing to consider hearsay evidence, although belied by the plain language of
the order,11 is not harmful error.
Hence, because Petitioner cannot prove harmful error nor challenge a silent
finding of fact, her arguments not preserved below are precluded under the general
preservation rule. Petitioner cannot invoke the plain error exception to the
preservation rule because she cannot meet even one element of the exception for
any of her arguments, let alone all three which are required to invoke the
exception.

11

At best, Petitioner's claim is that silence by the Board concerning Petitioner's
hearsay evidence constitutes non-consideration. Of course, Petitioner provides no
support for such an obviously erroneous proposition.

B. PETITIONER'S ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL ARE NOT "EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES" IN WHICH TO INVOKE THIS EXCEPTION TO THE
PRESERVATION RULE.

Similar to the plain error analysis, Petitioner failed to demonstrate any
"exceptional circumstances" to invoke an exception to the general rule that an
issue is waived on appeal if not preserved before the trier of fact,. Although the
Court has characterized this exception as "ill-defined", State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1209, n.3 (Utah 1993), the Court of Appeals, in State v. Irwin, attempted to
glean from the common law the principles on which the "exceptional
circumstances" exception applies, concluding, "With the possible exception of an
aberration or two, 'exceptional circumstances' is a concept that is used sparingly,
properly reserved for truly exceptional situations, for cases . . . involving 'rare
procedural anomalies.'" Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah Ct App. 1996), quoting,
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209, n.3 (Utah 1993)(finding exceptional
circumstances exception is "ill-defined, and applies primarily to rare procedural
anomalies . . . " ) ; See also, State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, If 23, 94 P.3d
186, 191 (Utah 2004)(holding, identically to Irwin, that exceptional circumstances
only applies "sparingly" and in the "most unusual circumstances"); State v.
McCloud, 2005 UT 466, If 14, 126 P.3d 775, 778-79 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
Petitioner also failed to point to any unusual circumstance which rises to the
level of "extraordinary importance" or "widespread interest" to invoke the
exceptional circumstances exception. Irwin, 924 P.3d at 11. " . . . [n]ot in every

case with some peculiar twist will appellate courts invoke the 'exceptional
circumstances' label and reach an issue otherwise impervious to appellate review."
Id, at 8. Even constitutional questions such as due process have not been deemed
of "extraordinary importance" or "widespread interest" to invoke the exception.
See e.g., State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah 1991)("We conclude that
a defendant may not assert a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal unless
he can demonstrate 'plain error' or 'exceptional circumstances.'"); Pratt v. City
Council of City ofRiverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173-74 (Utah 1981)(holding that the
general preservation rule "applies equally to constitutional issues"); State v.
Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah App. 1991) ("This court has previously
declined to consider Utah constitutional arguments because '[nominally alluding
to such different constitutional guarantees without any analysis before the trial
court does not sufficiently raise the issue to permit consideration by this court on
appeal.'" quoting, State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App. 1989)).
Here, Petitioner cannot point to any exceptional circumstance or "rare
procedural anomaly" to invoke this exception.

Changes in law or in settled

interpretation of law following a hearing/trial are the types of "rare procedural
anomalies" which the Court accepts as exceptional circumstances under this rule.
See, e.g. State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993)(overturning conviction for

12

Although Petitioner advances her "four reasons to invoke the exception" that
seem at least modestly to apply to the exception, none of Petitioner's excuses have
ever been recognized by any court as being exceptional enough to invoke the
exception. See, Irwin for a discussion on the doctrine.

crime not recognized in Utah following recent Supreme Court decision); State v.
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)(allowing defendant to make argument before
the Supreme Court not preserved before trial court, but was basis of decision by
Court of Appeals); State v. McCloud, 2005 UT 466, If 14, 126 P.3d 775, 778-79
(Utah Ct. App. 2005)(finding that change in law colored failure to raise issue at
trial). This list of cases is illustrative to show that the most common procedural
irregularity recognized as an exceptional circumstance is "where a change in law
or the settled interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at
trial.11 Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10. Petitioner failed to point to any recent change in the
law in this case.
Additionally, the court uses this rule in an attempt to allow for fairness when
there is some legitimate reason why a party failed to raise an issue before the
AHO/trial court. In her Brief, Petitioner failed to, and indeed, cannot point to,
any reason, either rare or common, either procedural or substantive, why she failed
to preserve any constitutional procedural due process, statutory interpretation of
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-403, or AHO error issues before the AHO. Because she
simply cannot prove any rare procedural anomaly to invoke the exceptional
circumstances exception, she is precluded from arguing issues not raised before
the AHO for the first time on appeal.

II.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE BOARD GRANTED PETITIONER

CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BY GRANTING HER A FULL
AND FAIR HEARING.
1 *\

Even if the Court allows Petitioner to raise due process issues she failed to
raise before the AHO, the Board afforded Petitioner complete procedural due
process by allowing her to contest the denial of continuing retirement benefits at a
hearing.14 Strangely, Petitioner alleges the Board failed to grant her notice and
opportunity to be heard following a formal administrative hearing in which
Petitioner admits she received notice, obtained legal counsel, called witnesses,
presented evidence, and cross-examined Board witnesses. See, HR 5, HT 3:1-3,
4:2-3, 16:2-4, 40-49. In fact, no allegation has been made, and indeed no credible
allegation can be made, that the Board did not follow its constitutional formal
administrative proceedings to the letter in denying Petitioner's claim.
Even Petitioner's claim that she was denied a chance to be heard at the time
of her husband's retirement election makes no cognitive sense as a procedural due
process claim. Such a claim would only arise if the Board had argued that
13
Utah courts have interpreted the federal due process guarantees identically to the
state due process guarantees. "Because 'Utah's constitutional guarantee of due
process is substantially the same as the due process guarantees contained in the
Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution,' In re
Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996), we need not undertake separate federal
and state analysis." Sierra Club v. Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Bd.,
964 P.2d 335, 346, n. 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
14
Petitioner made no explicit argument regarding a violation of substantive due
process. Although not expressly enumerated, her argument that she was denied
"notice and the opportunity to be heard" are procedural due process claims.
Petitioner's Brief at 11-14. The Board refuses to speculate on any substantive due
process claims which Petitioner believes she may have but failed to raise in her
Brief.

Petitioner could not present issues of Mr. Montierth's intent in selecting a
retirement plan at a hearing. In this case, the Board granted Petitioner wide
latitude to present any and all issues regarding Mr. Montierth's intent to make a
selection of a retirement plan at the hearing. Yet, even if she was denied a
procedural due process right, a dubious claim at best, Petitioner's remedy would
be to receive a hearing on the merits. One must wonder what kind of harm
Petitioner believes that she has suffered by not being able to bring a claim at the
time her husband made his retirement plan election since she was able to bring her
claim to challenge her husband's retirement plan election after her husband died.
By doing so Petitioner actually received more benefits by waiting until after
her husband died to contest her husband's retirement plan selection, since her
husband's election paid a higher benefit than the plan she is requesting.
Hence, all the evidence points to the fact that Petitioner received all the
process she was due through the administrative hearing process in participating in
a hearing before the AHO. As such, this Court should deny Petitioner's
procedural due process claim of a lack of notice and opportunity to be heard.
III.

EVEN IF PETITIONER CAN SURVIVE HER FAILURE TO RAISE DUE PROCESS
ISSUES BEFORE THE AHO, AND EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS SOME
UNCLAIMED FAILURE BY THE BOARD TO GRANT HER PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS, PETITIONER MAINTAINS NO INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY INTEREST
IN HER LATE HUSBAND'S RETIREMENT BENEFIT TO INVOKE THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE.

Neither common law, nor the unambiguous retirement statutes in Utah Code
Ann. Title 49, grant Petitioner any individual property right or an individual

"vested right" to a retirement benefit as the spouse of a retiree. As such, Petitioner
cannot sustain a due process claim for deprivation of property because she has not
been deprived of any property interest.
The Court has stated, "Under Utah law, public pension and retirement systems
give rise to vested contractual rights" Horn v. Utah Dep 't of Public Safety, 962
P.2d 95 (Utah Ct App 1998). A member of the retirement systems vests in his/her
contractual rights when he meets all the conditions precedent to receive retirement
benefits. See, Utah Public Employees Ass yn. v. State, 2006 UT 9, ^[29 (Utah Ct.
App. 2006)(citing, Horn, 962 P.2d at 100), See, also, Driggs v. Utah State
Teachers Retirement Bd., 142 P.2d 657 (Utah 1943). These vested contractual
rights constitute a property interest. Conversely, those without vested contractual
rights do not have a property interest in a retirement benefit.
Petitioner's reliance on Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982)
and other divorce or equitable distribution of marital property cases is misplaced
to show that Petitioner has an individual property interest in her late husband's
retirement benefit. Although the Court has recognized that non-vested retirement
benefits of an employee spouse may be included in a marital estate and divided
equitably by the Court in a divorce action, the Court has consistently stopped short
of calling such expectancy interests "property." See, Woodward, 656 P.2d 431.
Even more specifically, the Court has never held that such expectancy interests are
individual "property" held by the non-employee spouse.

Instead, the Court has repeatedly declared that retirement rights accrued
during a marriage are part of the marital estate, and that a non-employee spouse in
a divorce action may receive an equitable portion of retirement rights, not
property, when those rights are being equitably divided. See, Id. at 432-433, "[t]he
essential criterion is whether a right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or
in part during the marriage. To the extent that the right as so accrued it is subject
to equitable distribution."(emphasis added.). Id., See, also, Chambers v.
Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In fact, the Court does not
require a present value distribution of retirement benefits at the time of divorce, as
some other states require. In Utah, the Court mandates merely that retirement
rights accrued during the marriage, like future business earnings which can also be
split upon divorce, be apportioned to both divorcing parties equally. Without a
court's division of such rights upon a divorce, no separate individual property
right exists outside of the employee's right to a benefit. The legislature recognized
this rule in Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-612(3)(a) which states, "The office shall
provide for the division of an allowance, defined contribution account, continuing
monthly death benefit, or refund of member contributions upon termination to
former spouses andfamily members under an order of a court of competent
jurisdiction with respect to domestic relations matters on file with the office."
(emphasis added). Thus, only if the Court specifically grants an equitable
distribution of retirement rights pursuant to a divorce or similar proceeding and
the employee becomes vested in those contractual rights, does a spouse have a

separate, individual right to retirement benefits outside the employee. Absent the
Court splitting the retirement benefit and vesting by the employee, no separate,
individual retirement right is created with a spouse.
Here, because the Montierths did not divorce, and no equitable division of
retirement rights took place pursuant to a valid DRO, Petitioner maintains no
individual property interest in her late husband's retirement benefit.
As Petitioner admitted in her Brief, in order to prevail on a claim for due
process, she must prove some deprivation of a property interest. Petitioner's
Brief, at 7-8.
The retirement statutes are unambiguous concerning the conditions precedent
to receive a retirement benefit, or in other words, to vest in a property interest. For
the Public Employees' Noncontributory System, Utah Code Ann. §49-13-401l5
states,
(1) A member is qualified to receive an allowance from this
system when:
(a) the member ceases actual work for a participating
employer in this system before the member's retirement date and
provides evidence of the termination;
(b) the member has submitted to the office a notarized
retirement application form that states the member's proposed
retirement date; and
(c) one of the following conditions is met as of the member's
retirement date:
15

Each retirement system governed by the Utah Retirement Systems contains a
different section on the conditions a member must meet to qualify for benefits.
The Board quotes from the system in which Mr. Montierth participated, and which
Petitioner wishes she participated - the Public Employees' Noncontributory
System - Utah Code Ann. Title 49, Chapter 13.

(i) the member has accrued at least four years of service credit
and has attained an age of 65 years;
(ii) the member has accrued at least ten years of service credit
and has attained an age of 62 years;
(iii) the member has accrued at least 20 years of service credit
and has attained an age of 60 years;
(iv) the member has accrued at least 30 years of service
credit; or
(v) the member has accrued at least 25 years of service credit,
in which case the member shall be subject to the reduction under
Subsection 49-13-402(2)(b).
(2) (a) The member's retirement date shall be the 1st or the
16th day of the month, as selected by the member, but the
retirement date must be on or after the date of termination.
(b) The retirement date may not be more than 90 days before
or after the date the application is received by the office.
(emphasis added).
From this section, it is clear that only a "member" can obtain individual vested
contractual rights, and thus an individual properly interest in a retirement benefit.
In addition, only a "member" can submit a retirement application, and only a
member can select a retirement date. "Member" is defined in Utah Code Ann.
§49-1 l-102(23)(a) as "a person, except a retiree, with contributions on deposit
with a system... ."16 It is undisputed that Petitioner did not have contributions on
deposit with the Public Employees' Noncontributory Retirement System. Because

16

Petitioner erroneously claims that a "'member' includes a spouse of retiree.
Section 49-11-609." Petitioner's Brief at 8. The section Petitioner cites to states,
"As used in this section, 'member' includes . . . a spouse of a retiree." Utah Code
Ann. §49-11-609. Petitioner then attempts to apply this definition of "member" to
the entire Title 49 when it is specifically limited to this "section" of the Code.
Petitioner cannot even use the excuse that she did not know of the definition of
"member" contained in Section 49-11-102 which does not apply to the entire title,
since she specifically cited to that section in the immediate preceding sentence.
See, Petitioner's Brief, at 8.

Petitioner is not a "member," as defined, she cannot meet the conditions precedent
to obtain a vested right, and thus maintains no individual property interest in her
husband's retirement benefit. At best, prior to Mr. Montierth's retirement,
Petitioner was a potential future beneficiary of Mr. Montierth. Such a speculative
potential contract right is not a property interest. See, Utah Public Employees
Ass 'n. v. State, 2006 UT 9 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). After Mr. Montierth's
retirement and selection of a retirement plan with no continuing benefit to his
spouse, Petitioner had no relationship with the retirement office at all. Thus,
Petitioner cannot sustain any claim of due process against the Board for
deprivation of property because at no point in time did Petitioner have an
individual property interest in her late husband's retirement benefit.

IV.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, EVEN IF PETITIONER PROPERLY PRESERVED THE
ISSUE FOR APPEAL, THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. §49-13405(2) FAILS TO GRANT PETITIONER ANY RETIREMENT BENEFIT AS THE
SPOUSE OF A RETIREE.

For the first time on appeal, Petitioner wrongly argues that the Board failed
to follow the "spirit and letter [sic] o f Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2). Because
Petitioner failed to raise this argument before the AHO, she is precluded from
bringing this issue before this Court. See, discussion supra at 14. However, even if
the Court chooses to review this issue, it would find that the Board followed the
plain language of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) which explicitly does not apply
to the spouse of a "retiree."

Utah courts have consistently held that "when faced with a question of
statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute." CIG
Exploration, Inv. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 897 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995).
Furthermore, "The courtfs principal duty in interpreting statutes is to determine
legislative intent, and the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language
of the statute." Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah
1993); (citings Jens en v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah
1984). A court will only seek guidance from legislative history or policy
considerations when there is an ambiguity in the statute's plain language. See,
CIG, 897 P.2d 1214 at 1216. "The fact that the parties offer differing
constructions of the statute, in and of itself, does not mean that the statute is
'ambiguous.' 'Ambiguous' means capable of 'two or more plausible meanings."'
Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(citations omitted).
The policy behind this statute is also plain. Those members with long-term
service to the public who die not having retired and selected a retirement plan
option, are allowed a continuing benefit to their spouse. Meanwhile, those retirees
who had the option at retirement of selecting a continuing benefit to their spouse,
are not given a second option of a continuing benefit to their spouse at death. In
fact, adopting Petitioner's faulty interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405
would frustrate the actuarial soundness of offering different retirement options,
because every member would select a non-continuing benefit plan at the time of

retirement and then allow their spouse to convert to a continuing benefit, if
necessary, upon their death.
Finally, one wonders why Petitioner brought this argument after conceding
that this statute is designed "only for employees who die [sic] before they actually
retired." Petitioner's Brief at 15. In addition, Petitioner's assertion that the Board
violated "the spirit" of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405, is an implied, if not a
specific, admission that the plain language of the statute fails to grant Petitioner a
benefit. Petitioner's Brief at 14. Thus, Petitioner can make no legitimate
argument that Petitioner should be granted a benefit under the plain language of
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 because Petitioner's husband elected to retire and
was thus a retiree and not a member.

V.

EVEN IF NOT BARRED BY THE PRESERVATION RULE, THE AHO CORRECTLY
CONSIDERED PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE, INCLUDING HEARSAY EVIDENCE, IN
DETERMINING UNDER TITLE 49 THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO QUALIFY
FOR ANY CONTINUING RETIREMENT BENEFIT FROM HER LATE HUSBAND'S
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT.

Even if not barred by the preservation rule or the invited error doctrine
discussed supra at 17 & 24, the AHO did not err in admitting Petitioner's hearsay
evidence or ruling that Petitioner failed to prove an entitlement to a continuing
retirement benefit under Title 49. Petitioner failed to point to any proof that the
AHO did not consider her evidence presented or that the AHO failed to decide any
legitimate issues raised at the hearing.

First, Petitioner's allegation that the AHO failed to consider her selfserving hearsay testimony must fail because of a complete lack of evidence. The
Order's finding of fact No. 11 shows that the AHO and the Board specifically
admitted and considered Petitioner's hearsay statements when it states, "Petitioner
failed to provide any evidence outside of her testimony that Mr. Montierth
mistakenly selected retirement Plan 1 . . . . " Board's Order, HR 56 (emphasis
added). In addition, the AHO specifically alluded to Petitioner's hearsay
testimony in setting forth one of the reasons for his ruling by stating, " . . . based
on the fact that the only evidence that is given [regarding her husband's intent in
selecting a retirement plan] is the petitioner's statement of what she was told . . . I
can't see how I can do anything except rule for the Board . . . . " TR, 50:9-10.
Petitioner points to nothing to show that the AHO or the Board failed to admit or
consider her self-serving hearsay statements. Thus, no credible argument can be
made that the AHO failed to consider Petitioner's hearsay testimony based on the
evidence.
Second, the Board was correct in impliedly ruling Petitioner's testimony
regarding her husband's statements to her at the time of retirement were hearsay.
Either these statements were to prove the truth of the matter asserted, or Petitioner
has absolutely no evidence of any intent that Mr. Montierth wanted to select a
different retirement option than option one. Even Petitioner's counsel at the
hearing stated, "We will substantiate [Mr. Montierth's intent to select a different
retirement plan] by testimony from Ms. Montierth that will show she had

knowledge of Mr. Montierth's intention and that he, his actions were consistent
with him choosing plan three as opposed to plan one." HT 2:22-25. In fact, this
was Petitioner's only argument at the hearing. As a policy matter, a Petitioner
cannot claim her evidence should be used one way at the administrative hearing,
then claim it was being used a different way on appeal. Thus, no credible
argument can be made that these statements were not being used to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.
Third, the AHO and the Board decided all relevant issues raised by
Petitioner. Petitioner wrongly claims that the Board was required to make a
finding of fact regarding Mr. Montierth's intent in selecting a retirement plan.
Petitioner may only be granted relief from an appeal of a finding of fact, or lack
thereof, if, on the basis of the factual record, the court determines that she has been
prejudiced by Board action that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court. U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(g).
The Appellate Court does not conduct a de novo credibility determination or
reweigh the evidence. Questar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 850 P.2d 1175,
1178 (Utah 1993). Nor will an agency's findings of fact be overturned if based on
substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible.
Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Comm >?, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah
1988). It is the province of the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve
conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the
same evidence, it is for the agency to draw the inference. Albertons Inc. v.

Department of Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah App. 1993).
Petitioner cannot meet her high burden in challenging the Board's findings of fact
because she cannot show that "substantial evidence" in light of the entire record
required such a separate finding.
The Board's findings of fact regarding Petitioner's intent in selecting a
retirement plan benefit are clear:
4.

5.
11.

On August 15, 2002, Mr. Montierth filed an Application for
Service Retirement ("Application") with the Office for a July 16,
2002, retirement date.
On his Application, [Mr. Montierth] selected retirement, "Plan
1."...
Petitioner failed to provide any evidence outside of her testimony
that Mr. Montierth mistakenly selected retirement Plan 1 . . . . "

Board's Order, HR 56 (emphasis added).
In these findings, the Board impliedly determined: 1) the Application for
retirement benefits shows Mr. Montierth's intent to select a plan one retirement
benefit, and 2) Petitioner's only evidence to show a different intent was her selfserving hearsay testimony which cannot be the sole basis for a finding of fact.
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-10(3). Given these findings, the Board correctly ruled
that no finding of fact could be made that Mr. Montierth intended to select any
retirement plan other than plan one.
In the alternative, even if Petitioner had proven Mr. Montierth's intent to
select a different retirement plan at the time of his retirement, she was not
prejudiced by the Board's decision because even a retiree cannot change his
retirement plan selection after his retirement date. Utah Code Ann. §49-11-607(1)

states, "After the retirement date, which shall be set by a member in the member's
application for retirement, no alteration, addition, or cancellation of a benefit may
be made . . . . "

17

Thus, even if Mr. Montierth had been alive to testify that he

wanted to change his retirement plan, he could not have done so under the plain
language of this section. As such, Petitioner was not harmed by any alleged
failure by the Board in making, or failing to make, a finding of fact on Mr.
Montierth's intent to select a different retirement plan.
In sum, the AHO specifically admitted Petitioner's hearsay testimony
regarding Petitioner's statements, made findings of fact concerning Mr.
Montierth's intent, and correctly applied the hearsay rule. In addition, even such a
failure by the AHO did not prejudice Petitioner because she cannot change a
retirement plan election after the retirement date. Therefore, Petitioner's
allegation that the Board failed to "consider" her hearsay testimony and make a
requisite finding of fact must be denied.

VI.

MR. MONTIERTH'S SIGNED AND NOTARIZED RETIREMENT APPLICATION
WAS VALID AND COMPLETE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 49-13-402.

The only issue Petitioner raised before the AHO that is not precluded
before this Court is whether Mr. Montierth's retirement application was legally
complete. Utah Code Ann. §49-13-401 states, "A member is qualified to receive
an allowance from this system when:... the member has submitted to the office a
17

This section is quoted in its entirety supra at 8-9.

notarized retirement application form that states the member's proposed retirement
date;.. ." The plain language of the statute dictates that in order to be accepted to
effectuate benefits, a retirement application must contain: 1) a selection of a
retirement date, and 2) a notarized signature of the member. Utah Code Ann. §4913-402. It is undisputed that Mr. Montierth's retirement application contained
both a selection of a retirement date and a notarized signature of Mr. Montierth.
Thus, Mr. Montierth's retirement application was both valid and binding.18
Once the retirement application is complete, the retirement office cannot
second guess an applicant's retirement choices. As the Petitioner so aptly
explained, as a fiduciary, the retirement office maintains a duty to carry out a
member's expressly stated intent in his/her application. This is what Retirement
Director Judy Lund explained in her testimony when she stated, " . . . once we
[Office] have the application and if everything's valid we presume the member has
selected the plan he or she wishes . . . " HT 32:22-24. Indeed, one wonders how
the retirement office could do any differently.

Petitioner's claim of lack of a completed retirement application by Mr.
Montierth is dubious for another reason - standing. Mr. Montierth owns any claim
that he failed to complete the retirement application in some way. Petitioner, as an
individual, cannot step into his shoes and challenge the validity of this
application. Even if she was deemed the executor of his estate, which is not in the
record, any claim must be made in the name of the estate, not Petitioner's own
name. Thus, while a claim by Petitioner might be made as a Third Party
beneficiary, she failed to do so both before the AHO and this Court, and cannot
make such a claim in a Reply Brief. See, Murphy v. State Retirement Bd,
2004 UT App. 109, (Utah Ct. App. 2004), cert denied, 94 P.3d 929 (July 19,
2004).

Conversely, Petitioner mistakenly complains in her argument, that because
Mr. Montierth failed to sign the back of the retirement application, it is "null and
void." Petitioner's Brief at 19. Once again, Petitioner provides not one scintilla of
support for this erroneous proposition, and it is not supported by the evidence.
Further, Petitioner incorrectly complains that this lack of signature on the back of
the application proves Mr. Montierth failed to understand his retirement options.
Reviewing the evidence suggests otherwise.
First, Mr. Montierth, prior to submitting his retirement application, spoke
with the retirement office on the telephone and received three written estimates of
various retirement options available to him. See, HT 36:5-6, HR 50-53. After
receipt of these estimates, Mr. Montierth then completed a purchase of future
service credit in order to be eligible to retire attesting that he not only knew of his
retirement options, he selected one involving additional paperwork. Second, and
perhaps most telling of Mr. Montierth's knowledge of his retirement plans, Mr.
Montierth specifically attested by signing his application, "I understand the
limitations as described on the reverse side of this form." HR 47.
Third, not once after receiving his retirement benefits did Mr. Montierth
ever complain to anyone, not even his wife, that he had selected a retirement plan
that did not comply with his express intent. Thus, Petitioner simply cannot
credibly maintain that Mr. Montierth failed to understand the retirement plans
given the evidence.

Hence, because Mr. Montierth's signed retirement application complied
with the plain statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-402, and because
the evidence shows Mr. Montierth understood his retirement options, Mr.
Montierth's application was valid and binding under the plain language of the
statute.

CONCLUSION
The Board hereby asks this Court to reject Petitioner's appeal in its
entirety. Petitioner failed to raise due process, statutory construction, and
evidentiary issues before the AHO, thereby precluding her from raising them for
the first time on appeal. However, if Petitioner can survive her failure to raise
these arguments and issues, the Board granted Petitioner constitutional procedural
due process by granting her a hearing. In the alternative, Petitioner maintains no
individual property interest in her late husband's retirement benefit to invoke the
due process clause.
Additionally, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §49-13405(2) fails to
grant Petitioner any retirement benefit as the spouse of a retiree. Similarly, the
AHO correctly considered Petitioner's evidence, including hearsay evidence, in
determining under Title 49 that Petitioner failed to qualify for any continuing
retirement benefit from her late husband's previous employment. Finally, Mr.

Montierth's signed and notarized retirement application was valid and complete
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §49-13-402. Thus, Petitioner presented no valid
argument vt.-v she she Mil- : •- •-
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retirement benefits must be denied.

DATED this

a&
QV

day of February, 2006.
V.
David B. Hansen
Howard, Phillips & Andersen

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to David L. Knowles, Attorney for
Petitioner, 4723 Harrison, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84403 and Dennis A. Gladwell,
Attorney for Petitioner, 1893 Wasatch Drive, Ogden, Utah 84403 on this the
{7)0

day of February, 2006.
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ADDENDUM "A

BEFORE Illi: UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

KATHY MONTIERTH on Behalf of
Wesley Montierth (Deceased),
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER
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Hearing Officer: Barker
Respondent.

A hearing was held on August 22, 2005, before It

Adjudicative Hearing Officer on

Petitioner's Request for Board Action. Petitioner was represented by Rocky D. Crofts. The
Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") was represented by David B. Hansen. Based upon the
evidence in this matter and the legal memoranda submitted, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer
rendered a decision in favor of the Board. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer now makes the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Wesley V. Montierth ("Mr. Montierth) was a member of the Public Employees
Noncontributory Retirement System ("PERS").
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2.

PERS is administered by the Utah State Retirement Office ("Office").

3.

Prior to his retirement, Mr. Montierth requested and received three Retirement
Benefit Estimates ("Estimates").

4.

On August 16, 2002, Mr. Montierth filed an Application for Service Retirement
("Application") with the Office for a July 16, 2002, retirement date.

5.

On his Application, Petitioner selected retirement "Plan 1."

6.

On August 16, 2002, Mr. Montierth had his signature on his completed
Application notarized by Ms. Ann Hancock Young, a retirement counselor.

7.

Mr. Montierth's signed Application states in part:
In accordance with the statutes governing the Utah ELetirement Systems, I
make application for retirement benefits. I understand the limitations as
described on the reverse side of this form. I hereby certify that the
information provided on this form and any of the attached forms is true
correct, and complete to the best of my knowledge.

8.

For 27 months, Mr. Montierth and Kathy Montierth ("Petitioner") received and
benefited from a Plan 1 retirement benefit, which provided substantially more in
retirement benefits than any other retirement plan benefit.

9.

Mr. Montierth passed away on October 20,2004.

10.

Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Mr. Montierth.

11.

Petitioner failed to provide any evidence outside of her testimony that Mr.
Montierth mistakenly selected retirement Plan 1 and meant to select another
retirement plan on his Application.

2
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(4) provides that Petitioner bears the burden of proof in this
matter.

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-607(1), states, "After the retirement date, which shall be set by
a member in the member's application for retirement, no alteration, addition, or
cancellation of a benefit may be made except as provided in Subsections (2), (3), and (4)
or other law."

3.

Petitioner failed to provide'documentation or* testimony which A oi ild allow tier to change
Mr. Montierth's retirement plan after his retirement date.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's request to change Mr. Monthierth's
retirement *; .-> • • '.-M»- Jon-a

BOARD RECONSIDERATION
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. §49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite foi seeking judicial
review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and
one copy sent by mail to each person making the request. The Board chairman or executive
director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20) days of
receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied.

n nn n

JUDICIAL REVIEW
If Petitioner is aggrieved with thefinalBoard order, she may seek a judicial review
within thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued.
Petitioner shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah Court
of Appeals has jurisdiction to review allfinalBoard actions resulting from formal proceedings.
All petitioners shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16.

DATED this l 3 day of August, 2005.

</^p&nes L. Barker,

Jr.
r
Adjudicative Hearing Officer

The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the
Adjudicative Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board.

Dated this £3 day of September, 2005.

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

^/
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John Lunt, Board President

r\r\r\(\^&

ABHR<^iVED AS TO FORM

ocky Crofts

n nn n5 q

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this the f *•/ day of-August? 2005,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the above Order, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Rocky Crofts, Esq.
Smith Knowles
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden,UT 84403
David B. Hansen
Howard, Phillips & Andersen
560 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Utah Public Employees Association
and Roes 1 through 5,
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,

No. 20051121

v.
F I L E D
State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent.

February 16, 2006

Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable William W. Barrett
No. 050911548

Attorneys:

Benson L. Hathaway, Alexander Dushku,
Matthew K. Richards, Stephen W. Geary, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs
Clark Waddoups, Heidi E. Leithead, David C. Reymann,
Cheylynn Hayman, Salt Lake City, for defendant

Petition for Emergency Relief
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice:
SI
In its 2005 session, the Utah Legislature passed House
Bill 213 (H.B. 213), known as the "Unused Sick Leave at
Retirement Amendments." Although the Legislature set the bill's
effective date as January 1, 2006, we, at the request of
Petitioners, postponed the effective date of the amendments to
allow review of the constitutional issues presented in this case.
The Utah Public Employees Association (UPEA) and Roes 1 through 5
have asked us, on expedited review, to consider whether the
provisions of H.B. 213 result in an unconstitutional taking of
state employees' vested property rights. We conclude that they
do not.

BACKGROUND
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
f2
For more than 25 years, the State has permitted its
agencies to adopt an incentive program intended to both reduce
the misuse of sick leave and. to induce persons to work for the
State in spite of generally better private-sector wages and
benefits. This program originated in 1979 and has been subject
to periodic legislative change since its inception. The program
is currently titled the "Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option
Program" (the Program), and is found in Utah Code section 67-1914.2. Plaintiffs contend that the 2005 amendments to the
Program/ contained in H.B. 213, effect an unconstitutional taking
of employees' unused sick leave benefits by retroactively
devaluing already vested rights. The State counters that no
rights vest until the date of actual retirement, and therefore
the employees lack a constitutionally protected property interest
in those unused sick leave hours.
A. Statutory History of Utah Code section 67-19-14.2
53
Our extensive research led to the discovery that by
statute, the Legislature has occasionally changed the menu of
benefits that could be acquired upon retirement in exchange for
accrued and unused sick leave over the past 25 years, and that
the Legislature has imposed varied restrictions on how those
hours may be redeemed. We requested additional briefing on this
statutory history because in their original briefs on appeal,
both parties misstated the statutory history.
54
The most cursory reading of the statutory history
discloses that since 1979 the Legislature has empowered state
agencies to permit their respective employees to participate in
some form of unused sick leave trade-in program. At its
inception, the program permitted employees to "at the time.of
retirement" convert unused sick leave hours "into paid-up health
and medical insurance."1 Under this iteration of the statute, an
employee could convert 100% of accrued sick leave hours into
post-retirement health and medical insurance.2
55
Beginning in 1983, however, the Legislature changed the
language of the statute to require employees to accept a cash
pay-out for 25% of the accrued sick leave and medical and life
1

Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14 (1979).

2

See id.
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insurance for the remaining 75%.3 This distinction between the
sanctioned use of the 25% versus the 75% remained in effect until
1998 when the Legislature changed the statutory scheme again to
permit an employee to apply 25% to either a cash-payout or a
401(k) contribution.4 Then in 2004, legislative modifications
again allowed, but did not require, use of the entire 100% for
medical and life insurance benefits.5
§6
Due to the perceived desirability of the offered
incentives, most state agencies have chosen to extend the offer
to their employees, and many state employees have accordingly
reserved unused sick leave for the purposes permitted by the
Program. Participating State employees accrue sick leave hours
at the rate of four hours per two-week pay period, and many have
reserved, or "banked," a significant number of unused sick leave
hours. As the Program has been administered, upon retirement,
employees have been allowed to redeem these banked hours for
prepaid medical and life insurance coverage or for other forms of
cash-payouts. Generally, the Program has permitted employees to
exchange eight unused sick leave hours for one full month's
coverage of health insurance.6 Additional statutory provisions
3

Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14 (1983) ("The program shall
provide for an employee to be paid for 25% of unused accumulated
sick leave at the employee's preretirement rate of pay . . . .
An employee . . . whose unused sick leave, after the 25% cashout
has been paid . . . may continue health and life insurance.").
4

See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2 (1983), (1988), (1993),
(1998), (1999).
5

Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2 (2004) ("[U]pon retirement an
employee is paid for U P to 25% of the employee's unused
accumulated sick leave at the employee's rate of pay at the time
of retirement." (emphasis added)).
6

More specifically, the Program allows each retiring
employee to receive continuing medical and life insurance
benefits for up to five years or until age 65, whichever occurs
first. As briefly mentioned above, under the post-2004 version
of the Program, upon retirement an employee may redeem unused
sick leave hours in two ways:
(1) An employee is paid for up to 25% of the unused accumulated
sick leave at the employee's rate of pay at the time of
retirement. The employee may choose to have money from this
pay-out transferred directly to the deferred compensation
plan qualified under section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue
(continued...)
3
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permit employees to apply the remaining unused sick leave hours
to medical and life insurance coverage for spouses and other
dependents once the employee reaches the age of Medicare
eligibility.7
57
Our own research has also led to the discovery that
there have been widespread inconsistencies between the uses of
unused sick leave hour redemption permitted by the statute and
those allowed by state personnel regulations. 8 In many
instances, the regulations and practices appear to have permitted
use of 100% of unused sick leave hours to be traded for medical
and life insurance prior to 2004, although this practice was
clearly unsupported by the statutory language between 1983 and
2004. In fact, legislative debate regarding the 2004 statutory
amendment was represented by the bill's sponsors as intended to
bring the statute into accord with the widespread practice of
allowing retiring employees to apply all unused sick leave toward
paid-up medical and life insurance at the rate of eight hours to
one month of insurance.9

6

(...continued)
Code sponsored by the Utah State Retirement Board.
(2) An employee may purchase additional continuing medical and
life insurance benefits, at the rate of one month's coverage
per policy for eight hours of unused sick leave remaining
after:
(a) the 25% cash out of 401(k) payout, if any;
(b) and an additional mandatory deduction of 480 hours of
unused sick leave.
See Utah Code Ann. § 67-10-14.2(2) (2004).
7

Id^ §§ 67-19-14.2(2), 67-19-14.2(4)(a).

8

See, e.g., Utah Admin. Code R477-8-7(6)(c) (2000) ("An
employee may elect to receive a cash payment or transfer . . . up
to 25 percent of his accrued unused sick leave at his current
rate of pay." (emphasis added)).
9

The bill's sponsor, Representative David Clark, introduced
the bill by stating that "[i]n fact, the purpose of this
legislation is to make clarifying changes only that are based on
current agency interpretations and implementations of practice.
There are no substantive changes that are meant or to be included
in this draft." Audio recording: House Debate of H.B. 11, 55th
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 10, 2004), available at
http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=2004GS&Day=0&Bill=HB0
011&House=H (emphasis added).
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B. H.B. 213: An Amendment to the Program
18
Beginning in 2003, the Legislature expressed increasing
concern with escalating health insurance costs facing the State
under the Program. In a short span of five years, the costs to
the State for already retired employees nearly doubled.
Moreover, the State anticipated an additional increase in the
next ten years of more than 300%. The Legislature responded to
these concerns by modifying the Program in 2005 with H.B. 213.
In essence, this modification returns to the 1983-2004 statutory
scheme, although not the actual practice, which allowed only 75%
of the unused sick leave to be redeemed for medical and life
insurance. Under H.B. 213, the statutory scheme again limits the
use of the other 25%: banked sick leave falls into one of two new
programs, depending upon when the employee banked the sick leave
hours.
59
"Program I" applies to all sick leave accrued prior to
January 1, 2006, and implements a gradual, five-year phase-out of
the guaranteed continuing medical and life insurance benefits
(and the corresponding 480-hour automatic reduction of unused
sick leave) that had been guaranteed under the original Program.
Program I also eliminates the original Program's provision
permitting employees to cash-out up to 25% of their unused sick
leave and instead mandates that 25% be contributed to the
employee's 401(k). Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of
the Program I modifications as substantially reducing the value
of what they believe to be a vested right to use all 100% of
banked sick leave in exchange for post-retirement medical and
life insurance at the rate of eight hours of leave to one month
of insurance coverage.
510 "Program II'', on the other hand, applies to all unused
sick leave hours accrued after January 1, 2006. There is no
dispute between the parties that the State may implement program
changes with prospective effects. We find nothing erroneous in
that agreement, and as a result, we need not address the
provisions of H.B. 213 that apply to Program II.
C. The Parties
111 Plaintiffs Roes 1 through 5 have cumulatively banked
more than 8,000 hours of unused sick leave prior to January 1,
2006.10 In banking this many hours of sick leave, Roe Plaintiffs
10

Plaintiffs' complaint asserts the following facts about
Roes 1 through 5:
(continued...)
5
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took personal leave days rather than sick leave and often worked
when ill. Roes 1 through 5 testified that they had been told
that if they did not retire by December 16, 2005, they would not
be able to utilize all of their banked sick leave hours to
acquire medical and life insurance as they could have under the
2004 statutory scheme. Roes 1, 2, 4, and 5 are currently
employed with the State; Roe 3 retired on August 1, 2005. The
parties agree that a number of state employees retired prior to
December 16, 2005, to preserve the greater benefit allowed under
the 2004 language of the statute.
512 Acting in its role as the labor association
representing the interests of current and former public employees
on matters pertaining to public employment, UPEA commenced this
suit along with Roes 1 through 5. The record reflects the
extensive communication between UPEA and its members after the
10

(. . . continued)
(1) Roe 1 is 62 years old and has worked for the State for over
30 years. He has accumulated over 1,800 hours of unused sick
leave and had planned to retire in 2006, but due to the changes
implemented with H.B. 213, he plans to retire before the bill
becomes effective. If he retires after the bill becomes
effective, he loses nearly 5 years of health insurance coverage
which would have been covered by his accrued unused sick leave.
(2) Roe 2 is 58 years old and has worked for the State for over
30 years. He plans on retiring upon turning 60 in 2007. Under
the Program, his accumulated unused sick leave provides him with
medical insurance until reaching 80 years and 10 months old.
Under H.B. 213, however, his accrued unused hours will provide
him with health insurance benefits only until he is 75 years and
7 months old, a difference of over 5 years of coverage.
(3) Roe 3 is 45 years old and has worked for the State for over
20 years. He has accumulated over 2,100 hours of unused sick
leave. The effectiveness of H.B. 213 decreases the value of his
unused sick leave coverage by 5 ^ years.
(4) Roe 4 is 51 years old and has worked for the State for over
20 years. Post-H.B. 213, Roe 4 loses 6 years of medical
coverage.
(5) Roe 5 is 40 years old and has worked for the State for 14
years. She has accumulated over 700 hours of unused sick leave
and has recently declined numerous employment offers from private
employers, specifically relying on the State's health insurance
benefits from the pre-H.B. 213 Program.
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proposal of H.B. 213 and demonstrates that UPEA adequately
represents the interests of its members in this case.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
513 Plaintiffs UPEA and Roes 1 through 5 filed their
complaint on June 29, 2005, in the district court and
subsequently moved for a preliminary injunction to stay the
effective date of H.B. 213 pending resolution of their
constitutional challenge. The State opposed the injunction and
moved for a dismissal based on the allegations of the pleadings.
After briefing, the district court held evidentiary hearings on
November 7, 9, 16, and 18, 2005. On December 8, 2005, the
district court denied Plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary
injunction and granted the State's motion for a judgment in its
favor on the pleadings.
514 Plaintiffs petitioned this court on December 13, 2005,
for an emergency stay on the effective date of the statutory
changes to allow an appeal of the district court's decision.
Absent such an emergency stay, the window of opportunity for
employees otherwise in a position to realize the greater benefit
of exchanging 100% rather than 75% of their unused sick leave for
paid insurance upon retirement would have expired within three
days of the matter reaching us. We granted the emergency stay on
December 14, 2005, and enjoined, for at least until thirty days
after the final disposition of this appeal, the implementation of
H.B. 213's provisions insofar as they amend Utah Code section 6719-14.2. The State filed a motion to vacate the order granting
emergency relief and requested oral arguments on the matter,
which we heard on December 15, 2005. The State argued that the
petition did not meet the necessary standards we impose for such
relief, but ultimately agreed to the ongoing injunction with the
request that the court act with all possible haste so that the
impending legislative session might deal with any necessary
revisions of the scheme. We denied the State's motion to vacate
the order granting emergency relief, and to facilitate expedited
review of the matter on its merits, ordered Plaintiffs to perfect
their appeal on or before December 29, 2005, ordered expedited
briefing by the parties, and set oral argument on the merits for
January 10, 2006.
5115 Given the extremely short time allotted to each party
to present its arguments in the briefs, the submissions were
adequate. However, after oral argument, it became obvious to the
court that important and influential matters had not been
included in any briefing or argument by either party.
Consequently, on January 23, 2006, we requested additional

7
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briefing. The parties had failed to address the complex history
of the statutory scheme and its relevance to the constitutional
challenge presented. Moreover, the parties insisted on staking
out diametrically opposing positions, apparently without any
thought of assisting the court in finding a principled, legally
correct solution to the problem created by the obtuse language
employed in the statute and the actual practice engaged in by the
State over decades. Unfortunately, although the court requested
the parties to address those questions that most concerned it,
the parties chose in their supplemental briefs to either discount
the importance of the issues raised by the court or failed to
shed any meaningful light on the questions.
516 Ordinarily, in matters presented to the court, the
parties and the court have the benefit of thoughtful and thorough
analysis by both the parties and the lower court to expose and
resolve questions. In the case of an expedited review of this
sort, where the district court's order had not even been reduced
to writing at the time the petition was presented to us for
action, and the time for preparation of the briefs, record, and
other supplemental materials necessary for our review has been
shortened to the point of practical elimination, the usual help
given to the court by the parties has been diminished.
517 Nevertheless, it is the obligation of the court to
reach a conclusion on the questions presented. To not answer, or
to refuse to answer under such pressure of time, and with
inadequate help from the parties, is not an option. However,
since there is no other authority available to review and correct
our errors in judgment on the legal merits of the case presented
should we wrongly decide the question of constitutionality of the
statute, we are also required to do all that we can to discover,
consider, and incorporate those legal and statutory elements that
are critical to a correct decision. This we have labored to do.
118 It is also important to note that in a republican form
of government, and as specified in our state constitution, the
judicial power of the State is vested in this court. Moreover,
judges must exercise that power only in accord with the law and
the facts of the case, without regard to pressures brought by the
other branches of government or special interests of any kind.
This, too, we have labored to do. If media reports are accurate
of threats by members of the Legislature to withhold salary
increases for all state employees generally, and judicial
salaries in particular, in an effort to force this court to act
more quickly or to reach a certain result, then those making such
threats fail to grasp the very core of the separation of powers
doctrine and the value to the people of our state of a truly
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independent and responsible judiciary. Further, the suggestion
in the briefing of the State that a decision unfavorable to the
State's position might result in a negative impact on judicial
retirement benefits, among others, might also be perceived as an
unwise effort to appeal to personal interests, an effort that we
reject as disrespectful of our function and therefore of the
constitutional responsibilities of the judicial branch itself.
ANALYSIS
I. PLAINTIFFS MAY ASSERT A FACIAL CHALLENGE TO H.B. 213
519 When challenging the constitutionality of a statute,
Plaintiffs carry the burden of establishing that the statute is
"unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to the facts
of the given case."11
In this instance, because the statutory
changes set forth in H.B. 213 are not yet effective, the parties
may assert only a facial challenge. They concede that an as
applied challenge would be improper.
520 The State contests the availability to Plaintiffs of a
facial challenge, relying on United States v.. Salerno, a case in
which the United States Supreme Court required the challenger to
establish that "no set of circumstances exists under which the
[challenged] Act would be valid" in order to succeed.12 However,
in its reliance on Salerno, the State fails to acknowledge that
both the United States Supreme Court and this court have
discredited, at least to some extent, the application of the
Salerno standard. The facts of this case present circumstances
where Salerno is not the correct standard and need not be
followed.
221 When state courts interpret their own state law, the
United States Supreme Court has not required adherence to
Salerno. The plurality opinion in City of Chicago v. Morales
clarified that the "assumption that state courts must apply the
restrictive Salerno test is incorrect as a matter of law;
moreover it contradicts ^essential principles of federalism.'"13
11

State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, 1 4 n.2, 993 P.2d 854; see
also Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 251 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) (explaining that plaintiffs carry a "heavy burden" in
facial challenges).
12

481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) .

13

527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) (quoting Michael C. Dorf,
(continued...)
9
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We agree. The Court explained that because state courts are not
bound by federal law when assessing the constitutionality of
state law under state constitutions, they need not follow the
narrow interpretation of facial challenges found in Salerno.14
222 The Morales Court also suggested, by referencing
scholarly articles on the matter, that in state law cases in
state courts, a more appropriate threshold for determining the
validity of facial challenges may simply exist in establishing
the substantive merits of the case—the unconstitutionality of
the legislation.15
523 More importantly in this situation, we have rejected
the Salerno standard in some instances and have discredited its
universal application. For instance, in State v. Gardner, an
Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause case, we
determined that the "[s]tate's reliance on the due process
standard—*no set of circumstances exists under which the act
would be valid' [from Salerno1 — [was] . . . misplaced."16 We
relied rather on the broader Supreme Court standard for cruel and
unusual punishment cases found in Gregg v. Georgia.17
524 We have also declined to apply Salerno in takings
cases. In Smith Investment Company v. Sandy City, for example,
our court of appeals turned to the substantive law in determining

13

( . . . continued)
Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 4 6 Stan. L. Rev.
235, 284 (1994) ) .
14

See id. ("Whether or not it would be appropriate for
federal courts to apply the Salerno standard in some cases—a
proposition which is doubtful—state courts need not apply
prudential notions of standing created by this Court.").
15

See id.; see, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to
State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235 (1994).
16

947 P.2d 630, 645 (Utah 1997) ("[A] facial challenge to a
statute under the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
provision requires a different standard than that applicable
under the due process clause at issue in Salerno.") .
17

Id. (rejecting Salerno to follow Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 175 (1976)).
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whether a facial challenge was proper.18 In other words, the
court looked specifically to the constitutionality of the
legislation affecting the challenger's property.19 The court
held that if plaintiffs do not allege "any injury due to the
enforcement of the statute, there is as yet no concrete
controversy regarding the application of the specific provisions
and regulations. Thus, the only question before this court is
whether the mere enactment of the statutes and regulations
constitutes a taking."20 This is an approach we endorse. Many
other courts in the United States have likewise relied on the
substantive merits of the takings claim in determining the
validity of a facial challenge.21
525 Plaintiffs' facial challenge is validly brought under
both United States Supreme Court jurisprudence and our own case
law. As articulated by the Supreme Court in Morales, an
essential principle of federalism is that states have the

18

958 P.2d 245, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (relying on
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987)).
19

liL.

20

Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 493.

21

See, e.g., NJD, Ltd. v. City of San Dimas, 110 Cal. App.
4th, 1428, 1438-39 (2003) (describing the test for a valid facial
challenge as "straightforward" and based on the substantive law:
"whether the mere enactment of the legislation constitutes a
taking"); Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship v. County of Alameda, 110 Cal.
App. 4th 1246, 1266-67 (2003) ("A facial challenge questions only
^whether the mere enactment o f the land use regulation
constitutes a taking. The test to be applied in considering a
facial challenge is straightforward."); Glisson v. Alachua
County, 558 So. 2d 1030, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting
that when a taking claim arises in the context of a "facial
challenge rather than in the context of a concrete controversy
. . . , the only issue is whether the mere enactment of the
regulation constitutes a taking. The test to be applied in
considering a facial challenge is relatively straightforward,
i.e., x[a] statute regulating the uses that can be made of
property effects a taking'").
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authority to create their own constitutional law when reviewing
claims brought under their own state constitution,, Here,
Plaintiffs have filed their takings claim under the Utah
Constitution in Utah state court. Consequently, we are not
required to follow Salerno's "restrictive" test for facial
challenges, and we elect not to in this instance. Rather, we
conclude that because Plaintiffs UPEA and Roes 1 through 5 have
undisputed standing, the ultimate test for the propriety of
bringing a facial challenge lies in the substantive merits of the
claim. Thus, our analysis turns on the question of whether H.B.
213 constitutes an unconstitutional taking as alleged.
II. THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF H.B. 213 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
S[26 The thrust of Plaintiffs' claim is that the imposition
of the retroactive provisions of H.B. 213 constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of their vested property interest in the
banked unused sick leave. Article I, section 22 of the Utah
Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensation." We have
previously defined what constitutes a taking under this
constitutional provision: "A ^taking' is *any substantial
interference with private property which destroys or materially
lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed.'"22
Thus, to establish that H.B. 213 results in an impermissible
taking, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have a protectable
property interest in redeeming the banked sick leave hours for
medical and life insurance and that provisions of H.B. 213 would
result in the government's taking of that property.
A. Plaintiffs Do Not Have a Property Interest in the Specific Use
of Their Unused Sick Leave
5[27 "A claimant must possess some protectable interest in
property before [being] entitled to recover[y] under this
[takings] provision."23 In this case, Plaintiffs argue that
exchanging their banked and unused sick leave hours for medical
and life insurance at the rate authorized by the 2(304 version of
the statute is vested personal property to which they have a
22

Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah
1990) (quoting State ex rel. State Rd. Comm'n v. Dist. Court,
Fourth Judicial Dist., 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937)).
23

IcL at 625; see also Smith v. Price Dev. Co,, 2005 UT 87,
I 12, 125 P.3d 945.
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contractual right. As a general rule, public employment is
governed by statute and legislative policy, and is therefore
subject to change as thought best by the people, acting through
their legislative representatives.24 Nevertheless, the
modification of the terms of public employment are subject to two
common sense exceptions to the general rule: first, when a public
employee has a vested contractual interest in retirement
benefits;25 or second, when the government entity has entered •
into an express or implied contract by voluntarily undertaking
additional obligations beyond the relevant statutory
requirements.26 Plaintiffs argue that they have valid
contractual rights under both exceptions. We disagree.
1. Plaintiffs lack vested contract rights.
528 Plaintiffs assert their interests under the first
exception, claiming that a public employee has a vested
contractual interest in exchanging 100% of the unused sick leave
hours for medical and life insurance at retirement. We disagree.
529 Both parties argue that a public employee obtains
vested rights to retirement benefits "only when he has satisfied
all conditions precedent."27 We agree that parties must satisfy
all conditions precedent before the rights vest. The pivotal
question is at what point state employees satisfy the requisite
conditions precedent to vest a protectable property interest in
using 100% of their unused sick leave hours for medical and life
insurance.
530 As always, we first look to the plain language of the
statute to determine the conditions precedent. Based on the

24

Cf. Canfield v. Lavton City, 2005 UT 60, 1 16, 122 P.3d
622; Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 5 32, 99 P.2d 842; Knight v.
Salt Lake County, 2002 UT App 100, 5 8, 46 P.3d 247; Hom v. Utah
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 101.(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
25

See, e.g., Hansen v. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 246 P.2d
591 (Utah 1952); Newcomb v. Qgden City Pub. Sch. Teachers' Ret.
Comm'n, 243 P.2d 941 (Utah 1952); Driggs v. Utah Teachers Ret.
Bd., 142 P.2d 657 (Utah 1943).
26

See. Canfield, 2005 UT 60, 5 16; Buckner, 2005 UT 78,

1 32.
27

Horn, 962 P.2d at 100.
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statute and the accompanying regulations,28 the State contends
that the statutory scheme unambiguously dictates that an employee
may not receive retirement benefits until that employee actually
retires. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, interpret the statutory
language to mean that any member who chooses to bank unused sick
leave has a vested property interest to use that sick leave for
medical and life insurance benefits at retirement. We disagree
with both parties' statutory interpretations.
$31 Instead, we find the statutory language ambiguous as to
when an employee's right to redeem the unused sick leave for
medical and life insurance vests. Section 67-19-14.2 states that
"[a]n agency may offer the []Program to an employee who is
eligible to receive retirement benefits in accordance with Title
49, Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act."29 One
might expect Title 4 9 to provide direction on the conditions
precedent necessary for an employee to be "eligible to receive
retirement benefits."
132 Title 49, however, fails to clarify when an employee is
"eligible to receive retirement benefits." The Title, with its
eight parts and forty-four statutory sections, speaks of "service
credits," "benefits," and "allowances" but fails to explain the
distinctions, including when an employee is eligible for each.
The State argues that retirement benefits are synonymous with
"allowances." Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that if an
employees is earning service credits, an employee is eligible for
retirement benefits but not for allowances. Our research
indicates that neither retirement benefits nor allowances are
used to define or explain one another, and that employees are
generally eligible for service credits upon the effective date of
employment.30
533 Absent clear language regarding or an obvious
interpretation of "eligible to receive retirement benefits" in
section 67-19-49 and Title 49, we conclude that the statutory
language is ambiguous. It is clearly capable of more than one
28

For example, R477-7-6 of the Human Resource Management
Regulations Governing Sick Leave and Sick Leave Retirement
Benefits found in the Utah Administrative Code states that
"[u]pon retirement from active employment, an employee may be
offered a retirement benefit program, according to Section 67-1914(2) ."
29

Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2(b) (emphasis added).

30

S.ee Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-12-201(1), -401.
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logical meaning within the statutory scheme. For example, a
state employee might be "eligible to receive retirement benefits"
when she reaches the length of service required for retirement
and the age required for retirement, and submits her signed
notice of retirement to the appropriate office or official of
state government. Alternatively, one might be "eligible to
receive retirement benefits" when reaching the service and age
minimums, even if he continues to work. Additionally, one might
be considered "eligible to receive retirement benefits" when one
is employed in a full-time position by the State, in an agency or
position for which there exists a retirement program under the
extensive provisions of Title 49. While one or more of these
possibilities may seem more logical, useful, or fair than
another, such is not the question we face. Unable to accurately
discern from the naked language alone which of the possible
meanings is the meaning intended by the legislative drafters, we
have no choice but to examine other appropriate evidence of what
meaning is correct.
134 Moreover, the plausible interpretations of the isolated
word "eligible" in both section 67-19-14.2 and Title 49 also
render the statutory language ambiguous. The State suggests that
one is "eligible" when one is "qualified" to receive an
allowance.31 UPEA, on the other hand, argues that because Title
49 never refers to "eligibility" in relation to allowance but
rather only in respect to service credits, "eligible to receive
retirement benefits" cannot be synonymous with "qualified to
receive an allowance."
135 Furthermore, our prior case law suggests that "eligible
to receive retirement benefits" is an ambiguous phrase. In
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System Board of
Administration, for instance, we struggled with how to define
eligibility for retirement benefits.32 We held there that an
employee "who has neither served the necessary years to qualify
for pension, nor attained the retirement age [ ] has no vested
rights in the pension or retirement system"33 and that since the
plaintiff had "neither served the time requisite to entitle him
to retire and receive a pension, nor had he attained retirement
age," he had no vested rights in a pension or the retirement

31

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-12-401(1), -402; 49-13-401(1),

32

246 P.2d 591, 596 (1952) .

33

IdL

-402.
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system.34 This interpretation adds to the ambiguity because it
implies that an employee may be eligible to receive retirement
benefits upon attaining retirement age, serving a requisite
number of years, qualifying for retirement benefits, or some
combination thereof.
536 Consequently, we conclude that section 67-19-14.2 lacks
a clear meaning for "eligible to receive retirement benefits"
because the language gives rise to several plausible
interpretations. As noted, it may refer to the time at which the
employee walks out of the building for the last time and actually
retires, or perhaps to the point when, after having worked for
the State the requisite number of years to receive contributions
to the Utah Retirement System, the employee chooses yet to
continue state employment. It may also mean the condition
described under Utah Code sections 49.12.201, 49.13.201,
49.14.201 and any of the other general membership requirements to
the sixteen retirement acts listed under Title 49.35 Each of
those sections applies to any full-time employee whose employer
chose to participate in the described program and who is earning
service credits. Both the statutory language and Utah case law
are ambiguous as to whether employees' property rights vest at
eligibility for retirement, actual retirement, or eligibility for
the payout.
537 We accordingly turn to the available indications of
legislative intent to determine at what point all conditions
precedent are satisfied for the vesting of employees' right to
redeem unused sick leave for medical and life insurance under the
Program.36 The legislative intent behind these particular
retirement benefits is clearly stated as "inducements to work for
the state"37 and "to reduce sick leave abuse."38 Logically, no
Id. at 596-97.
35

Utah Code Ann. §§ 49.12.201, 49.13.201, 49.14.201 (2004).

36

See Murohv v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 80 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) ("[W]here there is an ambiguity or uncertainty in a portion
of a statute . . . and if it is reasonably susceptible of
different interpretations, the one should be chosen which best
harmonizes with its [the statute's] general purpose.").
37

Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(16) (2005) ("*Total
compensation' means salaries and wages, bonuses, paid leave,
group insurance plans, retirement, and all other benefits offered
to state employees as inducements to work for the state."
(continued...)
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incentive exists if, as the State urges, the agency may offer the
benefit only on the occasion of the employee leaving his or her
state job by retirement. A benefit not known until the very day
on which the employee can do nothing to earn it, is no incentive
at all.
538 In fact, the undisputed evidence before the district
court was that state agencies routinely described the
availability of the sick leave conversion to prepaid medical and
life insurance at retirement to their employees for the very
purpose described in the statute: to encourage state employees to
remain state employed in the face of lower wages than available
elsewhere, and to encourage limited use of sick leave.
539 Thus, we conclude that state agencies inviting
employees to participate in the Program during the course of
their state employment constituted an offer by the State.
140 We also conclude, however, that the State's offer was
to exchange the unused sick leave for a benefit upon retirement,
but not necessarily any particular benefit. The various changes
in the statutory scheme from 1979 to 2004 clearly demonstrate
that the Legislature intended to reserve the ability 'to modify
the menu of available benefits, and did not intend to bind the
State forever to redeem 100% of the unused sick leave hours for
any one use, and in particular not necessarily for medical and
life insurance.
541 The critical issue is at what point employees can act
to accept the offer to redeem banked sick leave exclusively for
medical and life insurance. This is an important question
because employees' property interest to use these accrued hours
for medical and life insurance vests only after an acceptance of
the State's offer to redeem them in such a way.
542 In our review of the statutory language and relevant
legislative history, we are compelled to conclude that the State
intended employees to accept the offer to redeem the hours for
unused sick leave only upon retirement. For example, the
regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute provide that
"[u]pon retirement from active employment, an employee may be
37

(. . . continued)
(emphasis added)).
38

l£L § 67-19-14 (1979); id^'§ 67-19-14 (1983); id^ § 6719-14(1) (1988); id^ § 67-19-14(1) (1993); id^ § 67-19-14(1)
(1998); id^ § 67-19-14(1) (1999).
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offered a retirement benefit program, according to Section 67-1914.2."39 We can only interpret this to mean that at the time of
retirement an employee is offered a choice of the manner in which
the hours may be exchanged for other benefits of value. Those
choices can only be from those delineated in the then-current
statutory version of the Program. Only at that point may the
employee accept that particular offer to redeem the hours in the
manner set forth in the current statute. Moreover, as a matter
of ordinary contract law, until accepted, the State's offer is
subject to unilateral modification. Thus, a property interest in
accumulated sick leave hours for the specific purpose of
exchanging them for paid medical and life insurance cannot vest,
as a matter of law, until the employee retires. The result is
that the first exception to the general rule is of no consequence
in our analysis of Plaintiffs' claims.
2. The State undertook a voluntary obligation.
143 Nevertheless, a contract in a public employment setting
may also arise if the State "voluntarily undertake[s] an
additional duty that it would otherwise have no obligation to
perform,/'40 Plaintiffs argue that their contractual rights exist
because State agencies did exactly that in offering the Program
to their employees.
544 The State, on the other hand, argues that in permitting
agencies to choose whether to offer employees the benefits of the
Program, those agencies failed to undertake an additional
obligation beyond statutory terms,41 since the statutory scheme
authorized the offer. The State misinterprets prior Utah cases
on the issue. The cases to which the State cites, namely,
Buckner v. Kennard,42 Knight v. Salt Lake County,43 and Horn v.
Utah Department of Public Safety,44 deal specifically with
changes to prospective compensation, hiring procedures, or other
employment structures controlled only by statute and which the
State required the involved agencies to adopt. The statutory
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Utah Admin. Code R477-7-6 (2005).
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Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 1 34, 99 P.3d 842.

41

See id.
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2004 UT 78.
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terms at issue in those instances were not regarding additional
duties that the agencies "would otherwise have no obligation to
perform. "45
545 With the Program at issue in this case, however, state
agencies had no obligation to offer the incentives found in Utah
Code section 67-19-14.2 to their employees. Instead, the
Legislature specifically constructed the statute to state that
M
[a]n agency may offer the Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option
Program" to its employees.46 Therefore, in choosing to offer the
Program, state agencies volunteered to undertake the additional
duty of providing enhanced retirement benefits in exchange for
the employee taking fewer sick days and for staying with the
State until retirement. This constituted a valid offer to redeem
unused sick leave hours upon retirement.
54 6 Nevertheless, the critical question remains at what
point in time employees are able to accept the offer. As
described above, employees may not accept this offer until
retirement. The State's offer of various pay-out options,
specifically, the 401(k), cash-out, or medical and life insurance
coverage, can only be accepted when employees retire. At that
point, an employee chooses how to redeem accumulated unused sick
leave from the options then available, and the State is bound.
Until that time, however, the State retains the ability to modify
terms of the offer as needed or prudent.47
547 Therefore, although the State voluntarily undertook an
obligation to employees who bank unused sick leave to allow those
employees to eventually redeem unused sick leave hours for value,
the State's offer does not lock in the method of pay-out until
retirement. Consequently, it cannot be said that the State
voluntarily undertook an obligation to permit employees to redeem
100% of their unused sick leave hours for medical and life
insurance. Absent this specific voluntary obligation by the
State, employees have no protectable property interest in
redeeming all or any of those hours for medical and life
insurance until they reach actual retirement and make the
appropriate election from among the then-available options.

45

Buckner, 2004 UT 78, 1 34.

46

Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2 (1) (b) .

47

See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2 (the title to the section
includes "Payout at Retirement").
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B. We Need Not Address Whether H.B. 213 Materially Lessens the
Value of Plaintiffs' Property Interest
548 Because the ability to redeem 100% of the banked unused
sick leave hours for a particular purpose does not vest until the
employee makes a choice at the time of retirement, the option of
using them all for paid insurance is not personal property and
cannot be taken by the State. Consequently, we need not consider
the second prong of the takings analysis, namely, whether H.B.
213 substantially interfered with the unused sick leave hours in
a manner that destroyed or materially lessened their value or
abridged or destroyed employees' use or enjoyment of them in any
substantial degree.48 Because Plaintiffs lack a constitutionally
protected property interest in redeeming 100% of their unused
sick leave hours for medical and life insurance, their takings
claim fails.
CONCLUSION
14 9 Plaintiffs UPEA and Roes 1 through 5 have properly
raised a facial challenge to H.B. 213. Their facial challenge
fails on the merits because implementation of H.B. 213 does not
result in an unconstitutional taking under the Utah Constitution.
Plaintiffs have no present property interest in redeeming their
unused sick leave hours for medical and life insurance because
(1) although the State voluntarily offered to undertake a
contractual duty with them, State employees cannot accept the
offer specifying the form of redemption until retirement, and (2)
Plaintiffs contractual rights cannot vest until that offer has
been accepted. Further fact finding regarding a vital state
interest and a substantial substitute are unnecessary because
Plaintiffs lack a constitutionally protected property interest.
Thus, we conclude that H.B. 213 does not effect a taking of
property and is therefore constitutional under article I, section
22 of the Utah Constitution.
550 The decision of the trial court is affirmed. The stay
and injunction imposed by this court is vacated, effective 30
days frcm the date of this opinion. Further relief is denied.

48

See Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 625
(Utah 1990).
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551 Chief Justice Durham and Judge Greenwood concur in
Associate Chief Justice Wilkins' opinion.
552 Having disqualified himself, Justice Durrant does not
participate herein; Utah Court of Appeals Judge Pamela T.
Greenwood sat.

PARRISH, Justice, concurring:
553 I agree with the lead opinion's conclusion that H.B.
213 does not effect an unconstitutional taking of plaintiffs'
property. I write separately to express my opinion that state
employees had no vested right to exchange their accrued sick
leave for health insurance because the plain language of the 2004
version of the Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option Program
("Option Program"), Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2, limited
participation in the program to those employees eligible to
receive retirement benefits. Accordingly, state agencies could
offer the program only to those employees who had elected to
retire. Further, were I to assume the existence of a statutory
ambiguity with regard to the vesting issue, I would conclude that
extrinsic evidence of legislative intent and relevant principles
of statutory construction dictate the same result.
554 Plaintiffs raise only one claim on appeal, a facial
challenge to the constitutionality of H.B. 213. Resolution of
their facial challenge hinges on whether they can establish that
they had a vested right to exchange 100% of their accrued sick
leave for insurance. If so, H.B. 213 effects an unconstitutional
taking of their property. If not, their challenge fails.
155 As the lead opinion correctly states, because the terms
of public employment are generally governed by statute and
legislative policy, they are subject to legislative change. We
have recognized only two exceptions pursuant to which a public
employee may acquire a contractual interest in employment
benefits. The first is when a governmental employer has entered
into an express or implied contract by voluntarily undertaking
obligations beyond those provided by statute. See Canfield v.
Lavton City, 2005 UT 60, I 16, 122 P.3d 622. The second is when
an employee acquires a vested contractual interest pursuant to
the terms of the operative statute. See Hansen v. Pub. Employees
Ret. Svs., 246 P.2d 591, 595-96 (Utah 1952). I will address each
exception in turn.
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I.

PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ESTABLISH ANY PROPERTY INTEREST
PURSUANT TO THE VOLUNTARY UNDERTAKING EXCEPTION

556 To give rise to a protectable property interest under
the voluntary undertaking exception, the voluntary undertaking
must stem from an agreement that alters or adds to the statutory
terms and conditions of public employment. See Buckner v.
Kennard, 2004 UT 78, SI 34, 99 P. 3d 842. This exception appears
inapplicable in a case such as this where plaintiffs have raised
only a facial challenge to the governing statute.
157 As the trial court found, the plaintiffs in this case
rested their claims entirely on the statutory language.
Plaintiffs presented no evidence and the trial court made no
finding of any obligation or undertaking by state agencies apart
from the decision of the agencies to participate in the Option
Program as set forth in the governing statute. While agency
participation in the Option Program was voluntary, the terms of
that participation were indisputably statutory. Etecause
plaintiffs lodge only a facial challenge to H.B. 213, their
voluntary undertaking argument is entirely dependent upon the
statutory language, which, as discussed below, dictates that any
offer of program benefits may occur only upon retirement.
II. THE PLAIN STATUTORY LANGUAGE DOES NOT CREATE ANY
VESTED RIGHTS IN STATE EMPLOYEES UNTIL THEY ELECT TO RETIRE
558 I believe that the statutory language is determinative
in resolving plaintiffs' claim that they had a vested right to
exchange 100% of their unused sick leave for health insurance.
In prior cases involving the claims of public employees, we have
reasoned that the nature of the rights at issue "rest largely
upon the language of the particular statute" involved. Driggs v.
Utah Teachers Ret. Bd., 142 P.2d 657, 663 (Utah 1943); see also
Newcomb v. Ogden City Pub. Sch. Teachers' Ret. Comm'n, 243 P.2d
941, 944 (Utah 1952) ("[T]he rights of pensioners must be
determined by the purpose and language of the retirement act.").
559 When construing statutory language, this court adheres
to the well-accepted rule that we do "*not look beyond the plain
language of [the] provision unless we find some ambiguity in
it.'" State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, I 7, 31 P.3d 528 (alteration
in original) (quoting In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah
1996)); Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 2003 UT 21, 1 8, 70 P.3d 85. Only
upon finding ambiguity may we "seek guidance from the legislative
history and relevant policy considerations." Ostler, 2001 UT 68,
f 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, we may

No. 20051121

22

not resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation unless we first
find ambiguity in the statutory text. See id.
160 Like a contract, a statute is ambiguous when it may
reasonably Mbe understood to have two or more plausible
meanings.,/ Alf v. State Farm Fire & Gas. Co., 850 P. 2d 1272,
1274 (Utah 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining
ambiguity in the context of a contract); Saleh v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 2006 UT 1, 1 15,
P.3d
. But determining whether
there are two or more plausible meanings depends not only on the
text of the particular provision at issue, but also on the text
of the statute as a whole. See Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of
the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991).
Indeed, M[w]e xread the plain language of the statute as a whole,
and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in
the same chapter and related chapters.'" State v. Barrett, 2005
UT 88, 5 29,
P.3d
(quoting Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12,
I 17, 66 P.3d 592). As a result, a statute susceptible to
competing interpretations may nevertheless be unambiguous if the
text of the act as a whole, in light of related statutory
provisions, makes all but one of those meanings implausible. Id.
When viewing the act as a whole does not eliminate duplicative
yet plausible meanings, the statute is ambiguous, and we may
resort to extrinsic interpretive tools to resolve the ambiguity.
See Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 1 7.
561 As the lead opinion ably explains, the statutory
iterations of the Option Program from 1983 through 2004 all
required that employees convert at least 25% of their accrued
sick leave to cash or a 401(k) contribution. In all respects
material to this appeal, these prior iterations are therefore
indistinguishable from H.B. 213. As a result, only the 2004
iteration of the Program could have conceivably vested in state
employees the right to convert to health insurance the first 25%
of their accrued sick leave. I therefore confine my analysis to
the 2004 statute.
162 The 2004 statute provides that "[a]n agency may offer
the [Option Program] to an employee who is eligible to receive
retirement benefits in accordance with Title 49, Utah State
Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act." Utah Code Ann.
§ 67-19-14.2 (1) (b) (2004). The lead opinion concludes that this
language is ambiguous because it could be construed to apply to
(1) all regular, full-time state employees; (2) all state
employees who have reached the requisite age and years of
employment necessary to retire under a particular retirement
system; or (3) retiring employees. I disagree and conclude that
the statutory language effectively precludes agencies from even
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offering the Option Program until an employee has elected to
retire.
563 My analysis necessarily starts with "the usual and
natural meaning" of the operative terms of the statute. See
Saleh, 2006 UT 1, 5 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Offer" is a verb meaning "an instance of presenting something
for acceptance." Black's Law Dictionary 1113 (8th ed. 2004).
"Eligible" is an adjective referring to one who is "legally
qualified for a[] . . . privilege, or status," or "[f]it and
proper to . . . receive a benefit." Id. at 559. "Receive" is a
verb meaning "to come into possession of." Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 975 (10th ed. 1998). And because the
statute is phrased in the present tense, it allows an agency to
offer the "Program to an employee who JLS. eligible to receive
retirement benefits," not to an employee who may become or who
could be eligible to receive benefits some time in the future.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2 (1) (b) (emphasis added). Moreover,
subsection (2) of the statute specifically states that an
employee may purchase continuing medical and life insurance
benefits "upon retirement." Id. § 67-19-14.2(2).
564 The commonly understood definitions of these operative
terms dictate that state agencies could present the Option
Program for acceptance only to those employees who were
currently, legally qualified to come into possession of
retirement benefits. This renders implausible the interpretation
urged by plaintiffs, that the language allowed state agencies to
offer the Option Program to all regular, full-time employees. It
also undercuts the suggestion that the statute could plausibly be
interpreted to allow agencies to offer the Option Program to
employees with the requisite age and years of service necessary
to enable them to retire but who have not elected to do so.
Indeed, it is implausible to suggest that an employee who has not
yet elected to retire could be eligible to receive (as opposed to
be eligible to apply for) benefits. I therefore conclude that
the text of section 67-19-14.2 prevents an agency from offering
the Option Program until an employee elects to retire.
565 The majority rejects this interpretation as implausible
because it believes such an interpretation is inconsistent with
the stated legislative purpose of the program, which is to induce
employees to reduce sick leave abuse. I find no such
inconsistency. The fact that the program did not vest employees
with the contractual right to exchange 100% of their accrued sick
leave for health insurance does not necessarily mean that it
could not operate as an effective incentive program..
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566 Individuals routinely assume some degree of risk in
making life decisions, and there is no reason why employees would
necessarily require an iron-clad guarantee before being motivated
to reduce sick leave abuse. Nearly all aspects of compensation
and retirement benefits in both the public and private sectors
are offered as inducements to accept employment. But that does
not mean that those benefits become immutable contractual
guarantees as soon as an employee begins work or that any
employee can reasonably expect that an employer will be offering
the same benefits decades into the future. This principle is
aptly illustrated by the fact that the pre-2004 iterations of the
Option Program did not even include the option of exchanging the
first 25% of accrued sick leave for health insurance. It is also
illustrated by the majority's tacit assumption that the statutory
purpose of reducing sick leave abuse is fulfilled by its
construction of the statute—a construction that in practical
effect differs not at all from the interpretation urged by the
State and adopted by me.
567 My plain language construction of the Option Program is
bolstered by the language of title 49 of the Utah Code, which is
referenced in the 2004 statute. Title 49 of the Utah Code
consists of the Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act.
Chapter 11 of that act governs the administration of the system,
while chapters 12 through 21 establish various retirement systems
for specific classes of public employees. Although some of the
specific provisions of these various systems differ, the
statutory structure of each follows a similar pattern, and each
is consistent with my conclusion that eligibility to receive
retirement benefits can occur only when an employee elects to
retire.
568 First, each of the various systems distinguishes those
employees who are merely eligible to participate in the
retirement system from those employees who are eligible to
receive an allowance from the system. Membership in the system
is available to all "regular full-time employee[s] of a
participating employer" and begins on "the effective date of
employment." Utah Code Ann, § 49-12-201 (2002); see, e.g., id.
§§ 49-13-201, 49-14-201 (Supp. 2005). "when the legislature
referred to the class of employees eligible for participation in
one of the state retirement systems, it used the phrase "eligible
for service credit." Because eligibility for service credit
differs from eligibility to receive retirement benefits, I reject
the plaintiffs' contention that the phrase "eligible to receive
retirement benefits" could plausibly be interpreted to refer to
all regular, full-time state employees.
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569
I find the provisions of title 49 addressing
eligibility to receive allowances particularly helpful.
example, Utah Code section 49-12-401 (2002) p r o v i d e s :

For

(1) A member is qualified to receive an
allowance from this system when:
(a) the member ceases actual work
for a participating employer in this
system before the member's retirement
date and provides evidence of the
termination;
(b) the member has submitted to the
office a notarized retirement
application form that states the
member's proposed retirement d a t e ; and
(c) one of the following conditions
is met as of the member's retirement
date:
(i) the member has accrued
at least four years of service
credit and has attained an age of
65;
(ii) the member has accrued
at least ten years of service
credit and has attained an age of
62 years;
(iii) the member has accrued
at least 20 years of service credit
and has attained an age of 60
years; or
(iv) the member has accrued
at least 30 years of service
credit.
Each of the various retirement acts comprising title 49 contains
a similar provision.
See, e.g., id. §§ 49-13-401, 49-14-401
(Supp. 2 0 0 5 ) , 49-15-401 (2002).
170 At first glance, because these provisions use the
phrase "qualified to receive an a l l o w a n c e , " they do not appear to
clarify the meaning of the phrase "eligible to receive retirement
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benefits" as used in section 67-19-14.2. But further examination
of title 49 demonstrates that the legislature used the terms
"allowance" and "retirement benefits" interchangeably. See,
e.g., id. §§ 49-12-402(2) (Supp. 2005) (the "Option One benefit
is an annual allowance"), 49-12-405, (4) (referring to Option
Three allowance as "[s]ervice retirement benefits" and stating
that "benefits payable under this section are retirement
benefits"), 49-11-401(3)(b) ("[a]n allowance or other benefit"),
49-11-405(3) (2002) (referring to a "member's allowance" as
"benefit"). Moreover, the notion of being qualified or eligible
to actually "receive" an allowance or benefit is common to both
section 67-19-14.2 and section 49-12-401. They therefore support
my conclusion that those employees who are "eligible to receive
retirement benefits" must have satisfied the conditions
specified by section 49-12-401 for receipt of an allowance.
571 Justice Nehring opines that my conclusion in this
regard is undercut by other provisions of title 49. In fact,
however, much of his analysis improperly draws on sources
extrinsic to the statutory language. He suggests that the phrase
"eligible to receive retirement benefits" is distinct from the
phrase "qualified to receive an allowance" by drawing a
distinction between the terms "eligible" and "qualified."1 But
this distinction stems from an inspection of the statutory
language of pre-2004 versions of section 67-19-14. Prior to
2004, the statute provided that "[a]n employee must be eligible
for retirement benefits to qualify for the program." Utah Code
Ann. § 67-19-14 (Supp. 1999). Because the predecessor versions
of the 2004 statute used both "eligible" and "qualify," Justice
Nehring concludes that these words cannot be ascribed the same
meaning. He then suggests that, because legislative history
indicates that the legislature did not wish to make substantive
changes when passing the 2004 version of the statute, the
reference to title 4 9 must have implicitly preserved the
distinction found in prior iterations of the program. Finally,
Justice Nehring construes "eligible to receive retirement
benefits" to mean "eligible to retire." I pause to briefly
respond to these contentions.
112 First, we may not look to extrinsic aids to ascertain
the meaning of a statute where the statute is plain on its face.
Past versions of a statute and legislative history are

1

Plaintiffs have never urged the interpretation of the 2004
statute articulated by Justice Nehring, a fact somewhat at odds
with Justice Nehring's suggestion that his interpretation is
driven by the "plain" language of the statute.
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indisputably extrinsic aids. As such, they may be helpful in
resolving an ambiguity, but they may not be employed to create
one. As discussed above, the plain meaning of the statute is
that an agency may not offer the Option Program to an employee
until she elects to retire. Where the statutory meaning is
plain, resort to past versions of the statute and legislative
history is improper. Moreover, because the 2004 version of the
statute does not use both "eligible" and "qualify," the dichotomy
that Justice Nehring attempts to create between the two terms
does not logically become an issue.
SI73 In fact, the words "eligible" and "qualified" are
synonymous, and our case law does not mandate a distinction
between the two in the context of the Option Program. We have
stated that we give effect to each term of a statute and assume
that the legislature used each term advisedly. State v. Barrett,
2005 UT 88, 1 29,
P.3d
. But this does not mean that we
must, in all cases, ascribe competing meanings to synonymous
terms found in the same statute. This is particularly true here
where Title 49 uses the words "qualified," "eligible" and their
variants interchangeably. Compare Utah Code Ann.
§ 49-11-401(3) (c) (Supp. 2005) (instructing the-board to regulate
how service credits should "be credited toward qualification for
retirement" (emphasis added)), and id. § 49-11-403(1)(c)
(providing that an employee may purchase service credits based on
out-of-state public employment where she "does not qualify for
any retirement benefits based on the employment" (emphasis
added)), with id. § 49-11-404 (2) (d) (2002) (basing cost-of-living
increase factor "on the date the member is eligible to receive
benefits under a benefit protection contract" (emphasis added)).
Therefore, while Justice Nehring concludes that the legislature
used the word "qualify" rather than the phrase "be eligible" in
pre-2004 iterations of the statute for the sole purpose of
signaling that "eligible" means less than "legally qualified," I
cannot make that inferential leap.
574 More fundamentally. Justice Nehring defines "eligible"
as "able to choose." But the prevailing definition of "eligible"
is "qualified to be chosen." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary 374 (10th ed. 1998). If we insert this definition
into the 2004 statute, it reads, "An agency may offer the [Option
Program] to an employee who is [qualified to be chosen] to
receive retirement benefits." Because the State may not require
an employee to receive retirement benefits before the employee
fulfills all the requirements of Utah Code section 49-12-401,
including filing an application to retire, Justice Nehring's
interpretation is unavailing. In other words, the State may not
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require that an employee actually receive retirement benefits
before the employee has applied for retirement.
275 In addition to relying on prior versions of the
statute, Justice Nehring relies on legislative history for the
proposition that the 2004 amendment was not intended to make any
substantive changes to the Program. But in the absence of
ambiguity, reliance on legislative history is improper. And if
the legislative history of the 2004 statute truly indicates no
intent to make substantive changes to the Program, it is patently
unreliable because plaintiffs' only claim arises as a result of a
substantive change wrought by the 2004 amendment.2 Thus, Justice
Nehring's conclusion that the phrase "qualify for the program" is
functionally equivalent to the phrase "in accordance with Title
49" in the 2004 statute has no basis. Indeed, it is not
unreasonable to conclude that the reference to title 49 in the
2004 statute was intended to codify the pre-2004 regulation
providing that "the decision to participate [in the Option
Program] shall be made at retirement." Utah Admin. Code
r.477-7-6(b) (2000).
176 Justice Nehring also relies on other provisions of
title 49. But none of these provisions establish the meaning of
the phrase "eligible to receive retirement benefits." For
example, Justice Nehring points to the definition of "retirement"
contained in Utah Code section 49-11-102(34) (Supp. 2005). It
defines "retirement" as the status of an individual who has
"become eligible, applies for, and is entitled to receive an
allowance." Because eligibility to receive an allowance is only
one of three components of "retirement," Justice Nehring
concludes that eligibility to receive retirement benefits must
refer to a status distinct from retirement. I disagree because
the other two components of retirement (becoming eligible to
apply for retirement and filing a retirement application) are
conditions that must necessarily be fulfilled before one is
eligible to receive an allowance. Thus, the definition of
"retirement" may, in fact, be coextensive with the final act

2

In actuality, the legislative history indicates that the
legislature's intent was to conform the statute to agency
practice. Audio recording: Senate Debate of H. Bill 11, 55th
Leg. Gen. Sess. (Feb. 26, 2004) available at
http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=2004GS&Bill=HB0011&Da
y=0&House=S ("[The 2004 amendment] codifies existing procedure
. . . and the existing way that we use unused sick leave.").
29

No. 20051121

necessary to effectuate retirement—eligibility to receive
retirement benefits.3
177 In summary, I believe that the only way to read section
67-19-14.2 consistently with title 49 is to give "retirement
benefits'7 the same meaning as "allowance." Therefore, section
67-19-14.2 grants authority to an agency to offer the Option
Program to only those employees who have (1) ceased actual work,
(2) submitted an application to retire, and (3) attained the
requisite age and accumulated the requisite number of service
credits.. Given this construction of the statute, no public
employee could have obtained a vested right in the Option Program
prior to submitting an application to retire. In the absence of
any vested rights, H.B. 213 cannot effect a taking.
III. ASSUMING AN AMBIGUITY IN THE STATUTE, APPLICABLE
CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DICTATE THE SAME RESULT
178 Were I to assume the ambiguity of the statute for
argument/s sake, I would nevertheless reject plaintiffs'
contention that the statute endowed employees with a vested right
to exchange 100% of their accrued sick leave for health
insurance. I reach this conclusion on the basis of the statutory
history of the Program, the implementing regulations, and what I
believe to be the applicable canon of statutory construction.
17 9 There is a "well-established presumption'' that "absent
some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself
contractually, . . . xa law is not intended to create private
contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be
pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise.'" Nat' 1
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Rv. Co., 470

3

Justice Nehring also invokes sections 49-12-701 and 49-11103(2). Neither applies. While section 49-11-103(2) suggests
that title 4 9 should be liberally construed to provide maximum
benefits, it does not go so far as to suggest that it may be
invoked to create an ambiguity or to countenance a construction
inconsistent with the statutory language. It is also
questionable whether it even applies at all to our attempt to
construe the provisions the 2004 statute, which is found in a
different title of the Utah Code.
Section 49-12-701 is equally inapplicable. That section
governed an early retirement program that has not been available
since 1938. Its value in aiding our interpretation of the 2004
statute is therefore suspect.
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U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985) (citation omitted). In other words, when
it is unclear whether a legislature intends to bind itself, a
court should not infer such an intent. Cf. id. Because section
67-19-14.2 lacks a "clear indication" that "the legislature
intend[ed]" to bestow on state employees an irrevocable and
unalterable property right to exchange 100% of their banked sick
leave for health insurance, I would decline to find such a right.
580 This conclusion is not only mandated by the applicable
canon of statutory construction, it is consistent with the
legislative intent. As described in the lead opinion, the
various changes in the Program from 1979 to 2004 demonstrate that
the legislature intended to reserve its ability to modify the
menu of available benefits. The changes in the program since its
inception are, in fact, persuasive evidence that the legislature
did not intend to bind the State to forever redeem 100% of
accrued sick leave for health insurance benefits.
581 This conclusion is also consistent with the
interpretation of the statute adopted by the Director of Human
Resource Management in the applicable regulations. We previously
have recognized that an agency's interpretation of a statute it
administers may be given some weight. See McKniaht v. State Land
Bd., 381 P.2d 726, 731 (Utah 1963). In this case, the director
has effectively interpreted the provision at issue by
promulgating rules that explicitly allow an agency to offer the
Option Program to an employee only "[u]pon retirement." Utah
Admin. Code r.477-7-6 (2005). And the regulations also provide
that state agencies may opt in and out of the Program on an
annual basis, a provision that is wholly inconsistent with the
claim of a vested contractual right at any point prior to an
employee's election to retire. See id. Inasmuch as the
regulatory interpretation is abundantly reasonable and consistent
with the statutory language, I believe it should be given
considerable weight.
CONCLUSION
182 Although I agree with the result reached by the
majority, my reasoning differs. I conclude that both a plain
meaning analysis and an analysis that assumes ambiguity lead to
the conclusion that the 2004 statute empowered agencies to offer
the Option Program to employees only upon retirement. Because
the offer to participate in the Program could not be made until
an employee elected to retire, plaintiffs have no vested
contractual right to exchange 100% of their accrued sick leave
for health insurance.
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NEHRING, Justice, concurring:
183 I join Justice Wilkins's review of the statutory and .
procedural background of this case and note in particular my
agreement with his cautionary remarks about perceived attempts to
intrude on the constitutional obligations of this court to be the
independent voice of the rule of law under our form of
government. I also agree with Justice Wilkins that the
plaintiffs have standing to bring their facial challenge to H.B.
213 and that their facial challenge fails. I therefore concur in
the analysis of Part I and in the result of Part 11(1), as well
as with its conclusion that the language concerning the meaning
of "eligibility to receive retirement benefits" in H.B. 213's
predecessor statute is ambiguous.
184 Like Justice Parrish, I conclude that the statute that
H.B. 213 supplanted survives facial attack on the strength of the
presumption that the legislature cannot be bound unless it
manifests a clear intention to create or vest a private property
right. I find it unnecessary, however, to set out on a trek into
the uncharted terrain of extrinsic evidence in the hope of
resolving the ambiguity that infests the 2004 amendment to
section 67-19-14.2, nor would I reach the question of whether the
State undertook a voluntary obligation.
585 Although the lead opinion makes a persuasive case for
the ambiguity of section 67-19-14.2, the close textual exegesis
offered by Justice Parrish to defend her view that the statute
plainly and unambiguously conditions "eligibility to receive
retirement benefits" on actual retirement compels me to respond
with a text-based analysis of my own that reaches the contrary
result.
186 The portion of the text of the 2004 version of section
67-19-14.2 that bears on the question of whether the statute
created a property right in the Option reads as follows:
(1)
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(a) There is created the "Unused Sick
Leave Retirement Option Program."
(b) An agency may offer the Unused Sick
Leave Retirement Option Program to an
employee who is eligible to receive
retirement benefits in accordance with
Title 49, Utah State Retirement and
Insurance Benefit Act.
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Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2(1)(a) & (b) (2004).
587 According to Justice Parrish, this provision cannot
create a property right in the Option because an agency that
chooses to adopt the Option program does not offer it to an
employee until the employee has retired. This is not, of course,
an interpretation that can be harvested from the plain language
of the statute. An "employee who is eligible to receive
retirement benefits" to whom the employer agency offers the
Option need not necessarily be an employee who has retired.
Indeed, it is plausible, and in my view probable, that the phrase
is meant both to disqualify employees excluded or exempted from
participation in one of the State's retirement systems, such as
temporary employees, see, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 49-12-203
(2002), and to make the offer available to employees who have
satisfied the age and service requirements for retirement but who
have not yet retired.
188 It is therefore clear that Justice Parrish's contention
that the Option cannot be offered to an employee until the
employee has retired must derive from the phrase "in accordance
with Title 49, Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act."
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2(1) (b) . Although, as the lead opinion
notes, Title 49 is comprised of eight parts and forty-four
statutory sections, Justice Parrish relies exclusively on certain
portions of Title 49 while overlooking others to make her case
that the Option is offered to an employee only upon retirement.
589 Justice Parrish reasons that the clause "in accordance
with" that links the phrase "an employee who is eligible to
receive benefits" with "Title 49" means that Title 49 should be
canvassed for a provision that offers a supplemental definition
for just who "an employee who is eligible to receive benefits"
might be. Justice Parrish believes she struck pay dirt in
section 49-12-401 because that section details the status of an
employee who "is qualified to receive an allowance from this
system." According to Justice Parrish, such an employee is the
same employee described as one "who is eligible to receive
retirement benefits" in section 67-19-14.2 (1) (b) . Since the
employee described in section 49-12-401 must have satisfied both
the age and service condition for retirement and formally applied
to retire, Justice Parrish urges us to import formal retirement
into section 67-19-14.2(1)(b) as a condition precedent to
becoming an offeree of the Option. Two fundamental flaws
undermine her reasoning.
590 First, Justice Parrish's premise that the reference to
Title 49 in section 67-19-14.2(1)(b) inevitably compels the
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importation of the restrictive formal retirement requirement of
section 49-12-401 is erroneous. A review of the text of the
version of section 67-19-14 that the 2004 amendment modified
discloses why. That iteration of the conversion options
available for unused sick leave states that M[a]n employee must
be eligible for retirement benefits to qualify for the program.''
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14(1)(a)(iv) (1999).
191 This is a phrase that is less susceptible to competing
interpretations than its 2004 successor. It communicates the
unambiguous message that if a State agency offers a program that
permits agency employees to convert their unused sick leave, an
employee who has met the age and service requirements for
retirement but who has not yet formally retired may participate.
In fact, this language likely excluded employees who had, for
example, retired before the genesis of an unused sick leave
conversion program in 1975.
592 The phrase "[a]n employee must be eligible for
retirement benefits to qualify for this program" has enjoyed an
enduring presence within section 67-19-14. It first appeared in
1983. In that year, the legislature amended the unused sick
leave conversion provision to accommodate the legislature' s
desire to supplement the original rationale for providing
employees the opportunity to convert unused sick leave into
health and medical insurancer that is, the reduction of sick
leave abuse, with an incentive for state employees to retire
early, with the goal of controlling the growth of the state
workforce.1 Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14(2)(d). It was preserved
when the statute was amended in 1998 and again in 1999. Did the
2004 amendment to section 67-19-14 result in a substantive change
to pare back the class of those employees qualified to
participate in the program to employees who had provided formal
notice of retirement? No.
593 Neither the sponsor of the 2004 amendment nor anyone
who rose in the legislature to speak to the merits of the
amendment indicated that it would bring about any modification of
the substance of the pre-amendment language. Yet, the State's
reading of the 2004 amendment requires a dramatic interpretive
shift to a meaning squarely at odds with the legislative history.
This alone does not make the State's interpretation wrong.

1

The early retirement program that was created by the 1983
amendments and which at that time was grafted onto section 67-1914 was disconnected from the unused sick leave provisions and
recodified in Title 49. Utah Code Ann. § 49-12-70L.
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Indeed, the legislative history of the amendment would be
irrelevant if it proved to be at odds with the unambiguous plain
meaning of its text. The 2004 amendment can, however, be read to
conform its interpretation to the plain meaning of its
predecessor eligibility language acknowledging that an employee
acquired a property right in her unused sick leave without the
need to submit formal notice of an intent to retire.
594 The central alteration made by the 2004 amendment to
the then-existing eligibility language was the replacement of the
concluding phrase "to qualify for the program" with "in
accordance with Title 49, Utah State Retirement and Insurance
Benefit Act." The concept of eligibility is not, however,
displaced by the amending language. This is important. Even if
we were to limit our inspection of Title 49 to the sections cited
by Justice Parrish, we would nevertheless not be free to ignore
the text of section 67-19-14.2(1) (b) that expressly renders the
Option available to an employee "who is eligible to receive
retirement benefits." (emphasis added).
195 It is significant that the pre-2004 statutes contained
both the words "eligible" and "qualify." These two words persist
in the 2004 amendment, but in an altered context. Because
"eligible" and "qualify" appear prominently in every
configuration of statutes relating to retirement, we take a
closer look at them. The pre-2004 phrase "[a]n employee must be
eligible for retirement benefits to qualify for the program" may
be broken down into two components, one assembled around
"eligible," and the other around "qualify." We start with the
first half of the phrase, "[a]n employee must be eligible for
retirement benefits." There is no ambiguity in this phrase, and
thus no occasion to turn to extrinsic sources to divine its
meaning. We first observe that "eligible" is a word brimming
with potential. That is, to be eligible, one may be desirable,
fully capable of choosing or being chosen, but still uncommitted.
Just as a bachelor is eligible to marry by choosing to do so,
eligibility is defined by the ultimate choice or step a party
must complete in order to realize the matter. This is why a boy
who is under the legal marriage age is not yet eligible to
marry—there is no decision or step that the boy can make or take
to allow him to marry. So it is with the issue now before us.
An employee is eligible for retirement benefits when there exists
an election that she can make to start benefits flowing. Such a
point could not be on the employee's first day of work—
presumably there is nothing the employee could do at that point
to start to receive retirement benefits. However, without more
information, we cannot be certain that the new employee is
ineligible to receive retirement benefits because nothing in the
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statute explicitly states at what point an employee can choose to
begin receiving those benefits. All the pre-2004 statute told us
is that an employee must be eligible to "qualify for the
program."
596 The most logical interpretation of the link between
"eligible" and "qualify" is that the right to elect to receive
retirement benefits—to be eligible for those benefits—is one,
but not necessarily the only, requirement to access the program.
597 Therefore, it must be established when an employee
would be qualified. The best answer is found in section 49-12401, which tells us when a member is qualified to receive a
retirement allowance. In essence, this section states that
someone is qualified to receive an allowance when she has accrued
a specified number of service credits and attained a certain age,
and then ceased work and filled out the requisite paperwork.
Therefore, one must ask, how can an employee become eligible to
qualify? As discussed above, one is eligible when she can choose
to effectuate the matter for which she is eligible. The only
possible answer is that she is eligible to qualify when she has
accrued the mandatory service credits and age, so that she can
choose, at her discretion, when to complete the qualification
requirements by ceasing work and filling out the retirement
paperwork.
598 As mentioned above, the 2004 amendment to section 6719-14 was not intended to effectuate any substantive changes to
the statute, but merely to clarify its substance. This
description of the amendment is supported by what was done to
section 67-19-14.2 (1) (b). There, the statute dropped "to qualify
for the program" and replaced it with the language quoted above,
"in accordance with Title 49, Utah State Retirement and Insurance
Benefit Act." Where there may have been some initial doubt
before as to where one could discover the qualifications for
receiving the benefits provided by section 67-14-19, it was
replaced with an explicit reference to Title 49. Of utmost
importance is the fact that the term "eligible" remained in the
statute while pointing to Title 49. The first line of section
49-12-401 states that u[a] member is qualified to receive an
allowance from this system when," and then outlines the
requirements for qualification as discussed above. The key is
that although the word "qualify" was removed from the text of
section 67-19-14.2, it was preserved by the reference to Title 49
which replaced it, and which begins by describing the
qualification requirements. Therefore, the 2004 amendment must
be read, as its predecessor read, that an agency can offer the
program to an employee who is eligible to qualify for the

No. 20051121

36

program—in
credits and
who has yet
and filling

other words, to someone who has accrued the service
attained the age outlined by section 49-12-401, but
to effectuate that eligibility by ceasing employment
out the retirement paperwork.

199 This understanding is enforced by a more in-depth look
at Title 49. Justice Parrish's refusal to consider all the
provisions of Title 49 severely undercuts her contention that an
employee is not eligible to receive retirement benefits under
section 67-19-14.2(1)(b) until she submits a formal application
to retire. Taken as a whole, the content of Title 49 leads to
the inexorable conclusion that an employee acquires a property
interest in unused sick leave when she satisfies the age and
service requirements for retirement. Section 49-11-102(34)
defines "retiree" as "an individual who has qualified for an
allowance under this title." This definition is in complete
harmony with section 49-12-401 which, in sub-parts (b) and (c),
requires the submission of a formal application to retire and
satisfaction of age and service requirements before " [a] member
is qualified to receive an allowance from this system." Put
another way, the "member" in section 49-12-401 is a "retiree" as
defined in section 49-11-102(34). It is obvious that not every
"employee eligible to receive retirement benefits" is a retiree,
yet under Justice Parrish's statutory interpretation, they must
be.
5100 Title 49's definition of "retirement" further exposes
the weakness of Justice Parrish's invocation of section 49-12401. Section 49-11-102(35) states that "'Retirement' means the
status of an individual who has become eligible, applies for, and
is entitled to receive an allowance under this title." Under
this definition, the "member" identified in section 49-12-401 who
is "qualified to receive an allowance" is a "retiree" as defined
in Title 49 and has also entered the realm of "retirement"
because she has met the three conditions for retirement: she has
become eligible for retirement, she has applied for retirement,
and she is entitled to receive an allowance. It is clear from
the definition of retirement that eligibility to receive
retirement benefits is a status different than retirement.
Because the status defined as "retirement" is achieved by
complying with the requirements of section 49-12-401 to file a
formal application for retirement and to satisfy the age and
service standards, and because mere eligibility to receive
retirement benefits satisfies but one of the three elements of
"retirement," an employee must logically be capable of being
eligible to receive retirement benefits without filing a formal
application to retire.
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1101 Section 49-12-701 underscores the point that under
Title 49 an employee's eligibility to receive retirement benefits
does not require an employee to file a formal application to
retire. Title 49 defines the eligibility for and the benefits of
early retirement. Section 49-12-701(1)(a) makes early retirement
available if "the member is eligible for retirement under Section
49-12-401, or has 25 years of service credit." The only
reasonable interpretation of this provision is that the right to
choose to become a retiree under section 49-12-401, in other
words to become "eligible" for retirement, is separate and
independent from actually electing to retire and undertaking the
tasks—most notably the submission of a formal application for
retirement—necessary to make the employee "qualified to receive
an allowance" under section 49-12-401.
1102 Finally, Justice Parrish fails to explain why section
49-11-103(2) should be excluded from the provisions of Title 49
that should be considered under the "in accordance" directive of
section 67-19-14.2. This section states that "[Title 49] shall
be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits and
protections consistent with sound fiduciary and actuarial
principals [sic]."
5103 While I have considerable confidence in the correctness
of this textual interpretation, I do not discount the legitimacy
of Justice Parrish's closely reasoned approach. I therefore stop
short of asserting that my interpretation has won the day and
that section 67-19-14.2 should be crowned with my reading as its
sole, unambiguous reading. I am, instead, content to pursue the
more modest objective of reinforcing the lead opinion's claim
that the statute is ambiguous.
1104 Having offered up my interpretation of the statute
central to this appeal, I turn to interpreting the law that
governs how an ambiguous statute that purports to create a vested
private property right should be evaluated when confronted by a
facial challenge to its constitutionality. The key feature of
this law is the policy-based principle that the legislative
branch should be free to respond to the changing needs and will
of the people. The law acknowledges the fundamental need for
legislative flexibility and accountability when it imposes more
rigorous demands on those who would claim that the legislature
has bound itself by statute to duties and obligations that may
mature in the future to demonstrate with particular clarity the
legislature's intent to assume such future duties.
Owing to the unique policy considerations that attend to
commitments made by the legislature, I would end the facialchallenge inquiry into whether a statute creates a vested
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property right upon a finding that the statute is ambiguous. It
is unnecessary and contrary to the presumption against the
creation of statutorily-vested property interests to. take the
next step typically taken when confronted with statutory
ambiguity and examine extrinsic evidence, most notably
legislative history, for guidance on the intent of the statute.
5105 I hasten to add that although in this instance the
State is rewarded for successfully enacting a statute remarkable
for its impenetrability (during the course of this appeal I have
mused over how a lawyer who might have been visited by a state
employee in late 2004 would have responded to her request for an
opinion concerning the status of her unused sick leave), any
legislative body that chooses to adopt .as a strategy the notion
that there is victory in opacity would, besides betraying the
trust of the people, find that outside the context of a facial
challenge to a statute, ambiguity would offer scant defense
against the claim of a vested property right,
5106 The voluntary undertaking exception to the presumption
against the statutory creation of vested property rights provides
parties who believe that they have sustained damage through the
unconstitutional deprivation of a statutorily-conferred property
right the opportunity for redress under circumstances where no
statute clearly creates that right. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT
78, 99 P.3d 842. The lead opinion suggests that such a voluntary
undertaking must supplement an expressly-created statutory
obligation. This does not go far enough. Correctly understood,
the exception includes the use of evidence of a voluntary
undertaking to resolve a statutory ambiguity that bears on the
existence and scope of a claimed vested property right. In this
setting, evidence of a voluntary undertaking would be identical
in its form and purpose to extrinsic evidence that we call upon
routinely to aid in the resolution of statutory ambiguities.
This formulation of the exception would thereby compliment my
central proposition that the presence of ambiguity itself should
defeat a claim that a statute has conferred a vested property
right.
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